display all the ideas for this combination of philosophers
4 ideas
3181 | A one hour gap in time might be indirectly verified, but then almost anything could be [Rey] |
Full Idea: You couldn't directly verify that the whole universe had stopped for one hour, but you might indirectly verify it (by prediction) - but then almost anything could be very indirectly verified. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 5.4) | |
A reaction: Does indirect verification include time travel? Or perfect knowledge of quantum theory, and total knowledge of quantum states. Laplace's Hypothesis. |
3204 | The meaning of "and" may be its use, but not of "animal" [Rey] |
Full Idea: The view that the meaning of language of thought expressions is based on their conceptual role (derived from Wittgenstein's idea of meaning as use), is most plausible for the logical connectives like "and", but implausible for, say, "animal". | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.2) | |
A reaction: It was the logical connectives that got LW started on this track. If it doesn't work for 'animal' then does that mean we need two different theories? |
3205 | Semantic holism means new evidence for a belief changes the belief, and we can't agree on concepts [Rey] |
Full Idea: Semantic holism is a desperate measure. Belief content would be continually changed by new beliefs, evidence for a belief would change the target belief, and no two people would ever agree on concepts. | |
From: Georges Rey (Contemporary Philosophy of Mind [1997], 9.1.2) | |
A reaction: It is far more plausible to say language is a bit on the holistic side. Total holism is mad. |
20300 | Externalist synonymy is there being a correct link to the same external phenomena [Rey] |
Full Idea: Externalists are typically committed to counting expressions as 'synonymous' if they happen to be linked in the right way to the same external phenomena, even if a thinker couldn't realise that they are by reflection alone. | |
From: Georges Rey (The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction [2013], 4.2) | |
A reaction: [He cites Fodor] Externalists always try to link to concrete things in the world, but most of our talk is full of generalities, abstractions and fiction which don't link directly to anything. |