Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Francois-Marie Voltaire, John Searle and Barbara Vetter

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14 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
     Full Idea: Consciousness has a first-person or subjective ontology, by which I mean that conscious states only exist when experienced by a subject and they exist only from the first-person point of view of that subject.
     From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.5 App)
     A reaction: I think this is nonsense, and I don't think Searle believes it. He ruthlessly attacks so-called 'eliminativists', but the definition he gives here would make him an eliminativist about other minds. There is no such thing as 'first-person' ontology.
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
     Full Idea: There are not two kinds of consciousness, an information-processing consciousness that is amenable to scientific investigation and a phenomenal, what-it-subjectively-feels-like form of consciousness that will forever remain mysterious.
     From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Concl.1)
     A reaction: Fodor appears to be the main target of this remark. The view that we can explain intentionality but not qualia is currently very fashionable. I am sympathetic to Searle here. Consciousness isn't an epiphenomenon, it is essential to all thought.
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
     Full Idea: A system is either conscious or it isn't, but within the field of consciousness there are states of intensity ranging from drowsiness to full awareness.
     From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1)
     A reaction: I think this all-or-nothing view is the last vestiges of Cartesian dualism, and is quite wrong. Heaps of neuroscience (about blindsight, subliminal awareness, neurosis etc.) says we will never understand the mind if we think it is only the conscious part.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
     Full Idea: Although we experience objects both spatially and temporally, our consciousness itself is not experienced as spatial, though it is experienced as temporally extended.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6)
     A reaction: This observation was made by Descartes. This seems to require that I experience objects spatially, AND experience my consciousness. Do I experience the time passing, as well as the river moving? Einstein says if it is in time, it must be in space.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
     Full Idea: Apparently it is just a fact of biology that organisms that have consciousness have, in general, much greater powers of discrimination than those that do not.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.III)
     A reaction: This presupposes knowledge of which creatures are conscious. Clearly colour vision gives more information than monochrome vision. But presumably a computer could process more visual information than I could see. It doesn't have a fovea centralis.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
     Full Idea: The ontology of the unconscious consists in objective features of the brain capable of causing subjective conscious thoughts.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 7.II.7)
     A reaction: As it stands, this definition would fit a brain tumour. I think Searle is wrong. There is no sharp line between conscious and non-conscious brain events. Research has surely made it clear that dim brain events directly intrude into my conscious states.
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
     Full Idea: There are brain processes and consciousness, but nothing in between; no rule following, information processing, unconscious inferences, mental models, language of thought or universal grammar.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch.10.II)
     A reaction: The core of Searle's view. He likes to call consciousness a 'property' of brains. Edelman says consciousness IS a brain process. Essentially I agree with Searle. An unusual physical object can produce consciousness, but mere 'rules' etc. cannot.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
     Full Idea: If you deny the distinction between intrinsic and derived ('as-if') intentionality, then it follows that everything in the universe has intentionality (for example, stones seem to want to fall).
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 3.IV)
     A reaction: Searle makes this claim because he always takes mental phenomena like intentionality or consciousness to be all-or-nothing - and he's wrong. He refuses to acknowledge non-conscious intentional states - and he's wrong again.
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
     Full Idea: Water flowing downhill can be described AS IF it had intentionality: it tries to get to the bottom by seeking the line of least resistance through information processing and calculation…
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 7.II.1)
     A reaction: John Searle could be described as if he had intentionality, as his neurons chart their way through the information and desires that flood them. I am wary of his all-or-nothing approach to intentionality.
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
     Full Idea: Intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, desires, and experiences only function within a set of Background capacities that are not themselves intentional.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.I)
     A reaction: Why would the background not be intentional? Presumably the background is a set of beliefs about, or images of, how the world is taken to be.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
     Full Idea: Intentionality is defined in terms of representation.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 8.III)
     A reaction: Sounds okay, but representation of a tree (say) can be understood in imagistic terms, whereas extremely abstract concepts are a bit baffling. Then we realise that we conceive trees in that way as well, not as images.
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
     Full Idea: I claim that only a being that could have conscious intentional states could have intentional states at all, and every unconscious intentional state is at least potentially conscious.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 6.I.5)
     A reaction: The alternative to this is that robots and lower animals might have non-conscious states which are about something, because they process useful information but are unaware of it. If so, parts of the human mind might do the same, as in blindsight.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
     Full Idea: I am hesitant to use the word 'quale/qualia', because it gives the impression that there are two separate phenomena, consciousness and qualia.
     From: John Searle (The Mystery of Consciousness [1997], Ch.1)
     A reaction: He is trying to resist going back to 'sense-data', sitting uneasily between reality and our experience of it. Personally I am quite happy with qualia as an aspect of consciousness - just as I am happy with consciousness as an 'aspect' of brain.
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
     Full Idea: If I am conscious of a pain, the pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself.
     From: John Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind [1992], Ch. 4.1)
     A reaction: Crane quotes this to challenge it. Pain may be about apparent damage to the body. Pains are certainly informative.