Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Francois-Marie Voltaire, John Searle and Barbara Vetter

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4 ideas

16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
3826 A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
     Full Idea: The first condition on the self is that it should be capable of consciousness.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX)
     A reaction: This strikes me as a stipulative definition. It raises the question of whether it is possible that a lizard (say) is not actually conscious, but has some sort of propriotreptic awareness, and a 'central controller' for its decision-making.
3829 Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
     Full Idea: A self is conscious, persists through time, operates with reasons, carries out free actions, and is responsible.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.X)
     A reaction: Personally I would substitute 'makes decisions' for 'carries out free actions', but otherwise I agree, though he seems to miss a key aspect, which is that the self is in charge of the mind, and directs its focus and co-ordinates its inputs and outputs.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
3827 The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
     Full Idea: The self is not an experience, nor is it an object that is experienced.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.IX)
     A reaction: A nice dichotomy, that draws attention to the unique position of the self. Thanks to Descartes for focusing our attention on it. Personally I would say that the self is an object, which cannot be experienced by itself, but can be inferred by others.
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3820 The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
     Full Idea: Agency must be added to the bundle to account for how embodied bundles engage in free actions, and selfhood must be added to account for how agents can act rationally.
     From: John Searle (Rationality in Action [2001], Ch.3.VII)
     A reaction: I don't buy much of this, but I am inclined to say that a will must be added to the bundle to explain why it acts consistently and coherently. It is certainly ridiculous to rest with the picture of a person as a completely unstructured bundle.