Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E and Volker Halbach

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6 ideas

3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: If axioms are formulated for a language (such as set theory) that lacks names for all objects, then they require the use of a satisfaction relation rather than a unary truth predicate.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.3)
     A reaction: I take it this is an important idea for understanding why Tarski developed his account of truth based on satisfaction.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
     Full Idea: In semantic theories of truth (Tarski or Kripke), a truth predicate is defined for an object-language. This definition is carried out in a metalanguage, which is typically taken to include set theory or another strong theory or expressive language.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver) [2005], 1)
     A reaction: Presumably the metalanguage includes set theory because that connects it with mathematics, and enables it to be formally rigorous. Tarski showed, in his undefinability theorem, that the meta-language must have increased resources.
Semantic theories avoid Tarski's Theorem by sticking to a sublanguage [Halbach]
     Full Idea: In semantic theories (e.g.Tarski's or Kripke's), a definition evades Tarski's Theorem by restricting the possible instances in the schema T[φ]↔φ to sentences of a proper sublanguage of the language formulating the equivalences.
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 1)
     A reaction: The schema says if it's true it's affirmable, and if it's affirmable it's true. The Liar Paradox is a key reason for imposing this restriction.
Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: Semantic approaches to truth usually necessitate the use of a metalanguage that is more powerful than the object-language for which it provides a semantics. It is usually taken to include set theory.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 1)
     A reaction: This is a motivation for developing an axiomatic account of truth, that moves it into the object language.
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
Disquotational truth theories are short of deductive power [Halbach]
     Full Idea: The problem of restricted deductive power has haunted disquotational theories of truth (…because they can't prove generalisations).
     From: Volker Halbach (Axiomatic Theories of Truth [2011], 19.5)
The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
     Full Idea: Although the theory is materially adequate, Tarski thought that the T-sentences are deductively too weak. …Also it seems that the T-sentences are not conservative, because they prove in PA that 0=0 and ¬0=0 are different, so at least two objects exist.
     From: Halbach,V/Leigh,G.E. (Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver) [2013], 3.2)
     A reaction: They are weak because they can't prove completeness. This idea give two reasons for looking for a better theory of truth.