Combining Philosophers

Ideas for Anon (Dan), Antisthenes (Ath) and Paul Horwich

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5 ideas

3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
The redundancy theory cannot explain inferences from 'what x said is true' and 'x said p', to p [Horwich]
     Full Idea: The redundancy theory is unable to account for the inference from "Oscar's claim is true" and "Oscar's claim is that snow is white" to "the proposition 'that snow is white' is true", and hence to "snow is white".
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.2.9)
     A reaction: Earlier objections appealed to the fact that the word 'true' seemed to have a use in ordinary speech, but this seems a much stronger one. In general, showing the role of a term in making inferences pins it down better than ordinary speech does.
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Horwich's deflationary view is novel, because it relies on propositions rather than sentences [Horwich, by Davidson]
     Full Idea: Horwich's brave and striking move is to make the primary bearers of truth propositions - not exactly a new idea in itself, but new in the context of a serious attempt to defend deflationism.
     From: report of Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990]) by Donald Davidson - The Folly of Trying to Define Truth p.30
     A reaction: Davidson rejects propositions because they can't be individuated, but I totally accept propositions. I'm puzzled why this would produce a deflationist theory, since I think it points to a much more robust view.
Truth is a useful concept for unarticulated propositions and generalisations about them [Horwich]
     Full Idea: All uses of the truth predicate are explained by the hypothesis that its entire raison d'Ítre is to help us say things about unarticulated propositions, and in particular to express generalisations about them.
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Concl)
     A reaction: This certain is a very deflationary notion of truth. Articulated propositions are considered to stand on their own two feet, without need of 'is true'. He makes truth sound like a language game, though. Personally I prefer to mention reality.
No deflationary conception of truth does justice to the fact that we aim for truth [Horwich]
     Full Idea: It has been suggested that no deflationary conception of truth could do justice to the fact that we aim for the truth.
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.2.11)
     A reaction: (He mentions Dummett and Wright). People don't only aim for it - they become very idealistic about it, and sometimes die for it. Personally I think that any study of truth should use as its example police investigations, not philosophical analysis.
The deflationary picture says believing a theory true is a trivial step after believing the theory [Horwich]
     Full Idea: According to the deflationary picture, believing that a theory is true is a trivial step beyond believing the theory.
     From: Paul Horwich (Truth (2nd edn) [1990], Ch.2.17)
     A reaction: What has gone wrong with this picture is that you cannot (it seems to me) give a decent account of belief without mentioning truth. To believe a proposition is to hold it true. Hume's emotional account (Idea 2208) makes belief bewildering.