28 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |
18545 | The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |
23688 | Noncognitivism tries to avoid both naturalism and mysterious morality [Hacker-Wright] |
6237 | Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury] |
6234 | If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury] |
6233 | A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury] |
6236 | People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury] |
6235 | Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury] |
6232 | Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury] |
5642 | For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton] |