Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for 3rd Earl of Shaftesbury, Peter John Olivi and Keith DeRose

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18 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Relations do not add anything to reality, though they are real aspects of the world [Olivi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 4. Quantity of an Object
Quantity is the quantified parts of a thing, plus location and coordination [Olivi]
Quantity just adds union and location to the extension of parts [Olivi]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
Classical invariantism combines fixed truth-conditions with variable assertability standards [DeRose]
We can make contextualism more precise, by specifying the discrimination needed each time [DeRose]
In some contexts there is little more to knowledge than true belief. [DeRose]
Contextualists worry about scepticism, but they should focus on the use of 'know' in ordinary speech [DeRose]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
If contextualism is about knowledge attribution, rather than knowledge, then it is philosophy of language [DeRose]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 2. Aesthetic Attitude
The disinterested attitude of the judge is the hallmark of a judgement of beauty [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
Fear of God is not conscience, which is a natural feeling of offence at bad behaviour [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
If an irrational creature with kind feelings was suddenly given reason, its reason would approve of kind feelings [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
A person isn't good if only tying their hands prevents their mischief, so the affections decide a person's morality [Shaftesbury]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / d. Sources of pleasure
People more obviously enjoy social pleasures than they do eating and drinking [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is not intrinsically good, but its absence is evil, as public good needs it [Shaftesbury]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Every creature has a right and a wrong state which guide its actions, so there must be a natural end [Shaftesbury]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 5. Species
Things are limited by the species to certain modes of being [Olivi]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
For Shaftesbury, we must already have a conscience to be motivated to religious obedience [Shaftesbury, by Scruton]