8 ideas
19722 | We could know the evidence for our belief without knowing why it is such evidence [Mittag] |
19723 | Evidentialism can't explain that we accept knowledge claims if the evidence is forgotten [Mittag] |
19720 | Evidentialism concerns the evidence for the proposition, not for someone to believe it [Mittag] |
21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
19721 | Coherence theories struggle with the role of experience [Mittag] |
7413 | Without confidence in our beliefs, how should we actually live? [Tuck] |
18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |