Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for A.C. Ewing, Stewart Cohen and G. Aldo Antonelli

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21 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
19115 You can 'rebut' an argument's conclusion, or 'undercut' its premises [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 1. Nonclassical Logics
19119 We infer that other objects are like some exceptional object, if they share some of its properties [Antonelli]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 12. Non-Monotonic Logic
19111 Reasoning may be defeated by new premises, or by finding out more about the given ones [Antonelli]
19114 Should we accept Floating Conclusions, derived from two arguments in conflict? [Antonelli]
19113 Weakest Link Principle: prefer the argument whose weakest link is the stronger [Antonelli]
19116 Non-monotonic core: Reflexivity, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, Left Logical Equivalence, Right Weakening [Antonelli]
19117 We can rank a formula by the level of surprise if it were to hold [Antonelli]
19118 People don't actually use classical logic, but may actually use non-monotonic logic [Antonelli]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 10. Monotonicity
19110 In classical logic the relation |= has Monotony built into its definition [Antonelli]
19112 Cautious Monotony ignores proved additions; Rational Monotony fails if the addition's negation is proved [Antonelli]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
21513 We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
21497 If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / a. Contextualism
12893 Contextualism says sceptical arguments are true, relative to their strict context [Cohen,S]
12896 Knowledge is context-sensitive, because justification is [Cohen,S]
19558 Our own intuitions about whether we know tend to vacillate [Cohen,S]
19561 We shouldn't jump too quickly to a contextualist account of claims to know [Cohen,S]
19563 The context sensitivity of knowledge derives from its justification [Cohen,S]
19560 Contextualism is good because it allows knowledge, but bad because 'knowing' is less valued [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 6. Contextual Justification / b. Invariantism
12894 There aren't invariant high standards for knowledge, because even those can be raised [Cohen,S]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
19559 Contextualists slightly concede scepticism, but only in extremely strict contexts [Cohen,S]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
18671 The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing]