218 ideas
| 7396 | Hobbes created English-language philosophy [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
| 17240 | Definitions are the first step in philosophy [Hobbes] |
| 5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
| 6211 | Laughter is a sudden glory in realising the infirmity of others, or our own formerly [Hobbes] |
| 12027 | There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G] |
| 7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
| 8014 | Resolve a complex into simple elements, then reconstruct the complex by using them [Hobbes, by MacIntyre] |
| 5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
| 5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
| 17237 | Definitions of things that are caused must express their manner of generation [Hobbes] |
| 17239 | Definition is resolution of names into successive genera, and finally the difference [Hobbes] |
| 17241 | A defined name should not appear in the definition [Hobbes] |
| 5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
| 19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
| 17242 | 'Petitio principii' is reusing the idea to be defined, in disguised words [Hobbes] |
| 4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
| 12005 | The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G] |
| 17245 | A part of a part is a part of a whole [Hobbes] |
| 12010 | Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G] |
| 17258 | If we just say one, one, one, one, we don't know where we have got to [Hobbes] |
| 5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
| 16789 | Only supernatural means could annihilate anything once it had being [Hobbes] |
| 17253 | Change is nothing but movement [Hobbes] |
| 6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 7559 | Every part of the universe is body, and non-body is not part of it [Hobbes] |
| 12023 | Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G] |
| 2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
| 16670 | Accidents are just modes of thinking about bodies [Hobbes] |
| 16621 | Accidents are not parts of bodies (like blood in a cloth); they have accidents as things have a size [Hobbes] |
| 16734 | The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes] |
| 17247 | The only generalities or universals are names or signs [Hobbes] |
| 12017 | In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G] |
| 14960 | Bodies are independent of thought, and coincide with part of space [Hobbes] |
| 17250 | If you separate the two places of one thing, you will also separate the thing [Hobbes] |
| 17249 | If you separated two things in the same place, you would also separate the places [Hobbes] |
| 17248 | If a whole body is moved, its parts must move with it [Hobbes] |
| 12024 | If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G] |
| 16620 | A chair is wood, and its shape is the form; it isn't 'compounded' of the matter and form [Hobbes] |
| 16790 | A body is always the same, whether the parts are together or dispersed [Hobbes] |
| 17244 | To make a whole, parts needn't be put together, but can be united in the mind [Hobbes] |
| 16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
| 11885 | Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 12014 | An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G] |
| 12015 | Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G] |
| 17233 | Particulars contain universal things [Hobbes] |
| 12013 | Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G] |
| 13804 | A property is essential iff the object would not exist if it lacked that property [Forbes,G] |
| 13805 | Properties are trivially essential if they are not grounded in a thing's specific nature [Forbes,G] |
| 12012 | Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G] |
| 13808 | A relation is essential to two items if it holds in every world where they exist [Forbes,G] |
| 17246 | Some accidental features are permanent, unless the object perishes [Hobbes] |
| 13806 | Trivially essential properties are existence, self-identity, and de dicto necessities [Forbes,G] |
| 13807 | A property is 'extraneously essential' if it is had only because of the properties of other objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12022 | Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G] |
| 12025 | Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G] |
| 13809 | One might be essentialist about the original bronze from which a statue was made [Forbes,G] |
| 17251 | The feature which picks out or names a thing is usually called its 'essence' [Hobbes] |
| 16622 | Essence is just an artificial word from logic, giving a way of thinking about substances [Hobbes] |
| 17257 | It is the same river if it has the same source, no matter what flows in it [Hobbes] |
| 12853 | Some individuate the ship by unity of matter, and others by unity of form [Hobbes] |
| 17256 | If a new ship were made of the discarded planks, would two ships be numerically the same? [Hobbes] |
| 12020 | An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G] |
| 11888 | Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P] |
| 16794 | As an infant, Socrates was not the same body, but he was the same human being [Hobbes] |
| 17255 | Two bodies differ when (at some time) you can say something of one you can't say of the other [Hobbes] |
| 12003 | De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G] |
| 6215 | 'Contingent' means that the cause is unperceived, not that there is no cause [Hobbes] |
| 12028 | De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G] |
| 13810 | The source of de dicto necessity is not concepts, but the actual properties of the thing [Forbes,G] |
| 16582 | We can imagine a point swelling and contracting - but not how this could be done [Hobbes] |
| 12008 | Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G] |
| 12009 | The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G] |
| 12007 | Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G] |
| 12011 | Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G] |
| 12016 | The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G] |
| 12004 | Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G] |
| 12021 | Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G] |
| 12029 | We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G] |
| 5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
| 19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
| 19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
| 19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
| 6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
| 5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
| 2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
| 5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
| 2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
| 5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
| 5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
| 16638 | The qualities of the world are mere appearances; reality is the motions which cause them [Hobbes] |
| 2356 | Appearance and reality can be separated by mirrors and echoes [Hobbes] |
| 2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
| 6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
| 5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
| 5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
| 16688 | Evidence is conception, which is imagination, which proceeds from the senses [Hobbes] |
| 7405 | Experience can't prove universal truths [Hobbes] |
| 4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
| 5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
| 5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
| 5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
| 5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 2357 | Dreams must be false because they seem absurd, but dreams don't see waking as absurd [Hobbes] |
| 19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
| 5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
| 19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
| 5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
| 17238 | Science aims to show causes and generation of things [Hobbes] |
| 5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
| 5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
| 5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
| 2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
| 5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
| 5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
| 17260 | Imagination is just weakened sensation [Hobbes] |
| 19373 | A 'conatus' is an initial motion, experienced by us as desire or aversion [Hobbes, by Arthur,R] |
| 5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
| 5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
| 5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
| 5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
| 5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
| 5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
| 5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
| 5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
| 5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
| 5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
| 5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
| 5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
| 5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
| 5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
| 2358 | Freedom is absence of opposition to action; the idea of 'free will' is absurd [Hobbes] |
| 2384 | Those actions that follow immediately the last appetite are voluntary [Hobbes] |
| 6213 | A man cannot will to will, or will to will to will, so the idea of a voluntary will is absurd [Hobbes] |
| 2385 | If a man suddenly develops an intention of doing something, the cause is out of his control, not in his will [Hobbes] |
| 6214 | Liberty and necessity are consistent, as when water freely flows, by necessity [Hobbes] |
| 5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
| 6208 | Conceptions and apparitions are just motion in some internal substance of the head [Hobbes] |
| 2948 | Sensation is merely internal motion of the sentient being [Hobbes] |
| 5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
| 23987 | The 'simple passions' are appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief [Hobbes, by Goldie] |
| 17261 | Apart from pleasure and pain, the only emotions are appetite and aversion [Hobbes] |
| 17236 | Words are not for communication, but as marks for remembering what we have learned [Hobbes] |
| 5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
| 5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
| 5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
| 5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
| 5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
| 5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
| 5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
| 2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
| 2362 | The will is just the last appetite before action [Hobbes] |
| 7408 | It is an error that reason should control the passions, which give right guidance on their own [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 2363 | Reason is usually general, but deliberation is of particulars [Hobbes] |
| 6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
| 6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
| 7407 | Good and evil are what please us; goodness and badness the powers causing them [Hobbes] |
| 6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
| 6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
| 5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
| 6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
| 23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
| 5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
| 2360 | 'Good' is just what we desire, and 'Evil' what we hate [Hobbes] |
| 6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
| 6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
| 5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
| 7410 | Self-preservation is basic, and people judge differently about that, implying ethical relativism [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 2368 | Men's natural desires are no sin, and neither are their actions, until law makes it so [Hobbes] |
| 6209 | There is no absolute good, for even the goodness of God is goodness to us [Hobbes] |
| 2359 | Desire and love are the same, but in the desire the object is absent, and in love it is present [Hobbes] |
| 2370 | All voluntary acts aim at some good for the doer [Hobbes] |
| 7409 | Hobbes shifted from talk of 'the good' to talk of 'rights' [Hobbes, by Tuck] |
| 6210 | Life has no end (not even happiness), because we have desires, which presuppose a further end [Hobbes] |
| 8015 | Hobbes wants a contract to found morality, but shared values are needed to make a contract [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
| 2371 | A contract is a mutual transfer of rights [Hobbes] |
| 2372 | The person who performs first in a contract is said to 'merit' the return, and is owed it [Hobbes] |
| 5337 | For Hobbes the Golden Rule concerns not doing things, whereas Jesus encourages active love [Hobbes, by Flanagan] |
| 2374 | In the violent state of nature, the merest suspicion is enough to justify breaking a contract [Hobbes] |
| 8016 | Fear of sanctions is the only motive for acceptance of authority that Hobbes can think of [MacIntyre on Hobbes] |
| 2375 | Suspicion will not destroy a contract, if there is a common power to enforce it [Hobbes] |
| 2377 | No one who admitted to not keeping contracts could ever be accepted as a citizen [Hobbes] |
| 2379 | If there is a good reason for breaking a contract, the same reason should have stopped the making of it [Hobbes] |
| 2373 | The first performer in a contract is handing himself over to an enemy [Hobbes] |
| 2382 | Someone who keeps all his contracts when others are breaking them is making himself a prey to others [Hobbes] |
| 2383 | Virtues are a means to peaceful, sociable and comfortable living [Hobbes] |
| 2376 | Injustice is the failure to keep a contract, and justice is the constant will to give what is owed [Hobbes] |
| 2367 | In time of war the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short [Hobbes] |
| 19764 | Hobbes attributed to savages the passions which arise in a law-bound society [Hobbes, by Rousseau] |
| 20566 | Hobbes says the people voluntarily give up their sovereignty, in a contract with a ruler [Hobbes, by Oksala] |
| 2366 | There is not enough difference between people for one to claim more benefit than another [Hobbes] |
| 20485 | Hobbes says people are roughly equal; Locke says there is no right to impose inequality [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
| 2369 | If we seek peace and defend ourselves, we must compromise on our rights [Hobbes] |
| 20484 | We should obey the laws of nature, provided other people are also obeying them [Hobbes, by Wolff,J] |
| 7573 | The legal positivism of Hobbes said law is just formal or procedural [Hobbes, by Jolley] |
| 2380 | Punishment should only be for reform or deterrence [Hobbes] |
| 23609 | I act justly if I follow my Prince in an apparently unjust war, and refusing to fight would be injustice [Hobbes] |
| 2361 | If fear of unknown powers is legal it is religion, if it is illegal it is superstition [Hobbes] |
| 6212 | Lust involves pleasure, and also the sense of power in pleasing others [Hobbes] |
| 16600 | Prime matter is body considered with mere size and extension, and potential [Hobbes] |
| 17252 | Acting on a body is either creating or destroying a property in it [Hobbes] |
| 17254 | An effect needs a sufficient and necessary cause [Hobbes] |
| 2364 | Causation is only observation of similar events following each other, with nothing visible in between [Hobbes] |
| 17235 | A cause is the complete sum of the features which necessitate the effect [Hobbes] |
| 15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
| 17234 | Motion is losing one place and acquiring another [Hobbes] |
| 17259 | 'Force' is the quantity of movement imposed on something [Hobbes] |
| 17243 | Past times can't exist anywhere, apart from in our memories [Hobbes] |
| 5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
| 5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
| 7411 | The attributes of God just show our inability to conceive his nature [Hobbes] |
| 5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
| 2365 | Religion is built on ignorance and misinterpretation of what is unknown or frightening [Hobbes] |
| 5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |
| 2378 | Belief in an afterlife is based on poorly founded gossip [Hobbes] |