Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Adam Dance, Jerry A. Fodor and Donald Davidson

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330 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Who cares what 'philosophy' is? Most pre-1950 thought doesn't now count as philosophy [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
Definitions often give necessary but not sufficient conditions for an extension [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson]
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson]
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor]
A standard naturalist view is realist, externalist, and computationalist, and believes in rationality [Fodor]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
We have no successful definitions, because they all use indefinable words [Fodor]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 2. Transcendental Argument
Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson]
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett]
Psychology has to include the idea that mental processes are typically truth-preserving [Fodor]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson]
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson]
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson]
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson]
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson]
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan]
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson]
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson]
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson]
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson]
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson]
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Inferences are surely part of the causal structure of the world [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
A truth-table, not inferential role, defines 'and' [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor]
Names in thought afford a primitive way to bring John before the mind [Fodor]
'Paderewski' has two names in mentalese, for his pianist file and his politician file [Fodor]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 2. Domain of Quantification
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
P-and-Q gets its truth from the truth of P and truth of Q, but consistency isn't like that [Fodor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
If 'exist' is ambiguous in 'chairs and numbers exist', that mirrors the difference between chairs and numbers [Fodor]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan]
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson]
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson]
Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / c. Dispositions as conditional
Empiricists use dispositions reductively, as 'possibility of sensation' or 'possibility of experimental result' [Fodor]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
There's statistical, logical, nomological, conceptual and metaphysical possibility [Fodor]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Some beliefs are only inferred when needed, like 'Shakespeare had not telephone' [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson]
How do you count beliefs? [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
Knowing that must come before knowing how [Fodor]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / c. Empirical idealism
Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 3. Innate Knowledge / a. Innate knowledge
Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor]
Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor]
Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 2. Associationism
According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor]
Associations are held to connect Ideas together in the way the world is connected together [Fodor]
Associationism can't explain how truth is preserved [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
Pragmatism is the worst idea ever [Fodor]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor]
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson]
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
Control of belief is possible if you know truth conditions and what causes beliefs [Fodor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 2. Knowledge as Convention
Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
We can deliberately cause ourselves to have true thoughts - hence the value of experiments [Fodor]
Interrogation and experiment submit us to having beliefs caused [Fodor]
Participation in an experiment requires agreement about what the outcome will mean [Fodor]
An experiment is a deliberate version of what informal thinking does all the time [Fodor]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Theories are links in the causal chain between the environment and our beliefs [Fodor]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor]
The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mental states have causal powers [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor]
I say psychology is intentional, semantics is informational, and thinking is computation [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
We are probably the only creatures that can think about our own thoughts [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
How does anything get outside itself? [Fodor, by Martin,CB]
Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Is intentionality outwardly folk psychology, inwardly mentalese? [Lyons on Fodor]
Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor]
We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor]
Intentional science needs objects with semantic and causal properties, and which obey laws [Fodor]
Intentional states and processes may be causal relations among mental symbols [Fodor]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance
The different types of resemblance don't resemble one another [Fodor]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 6. Self as Higher Awareness
If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Semantics v syntax is the interaction problem all over again [Fodor]
Cartesians consider interaction to be a miracle [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 6. Epiphenomenalism
Either intentionality causes things, or epiphenomenalism is true [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
In the Representational view, concepts play the key linking role [Fodor]
Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 6. Homuncular Functionalism
Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson]
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson]
Contrary to the 'anomalous monist' view, there may well be intentional causal laws [Fodor]
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Are beliefs brains states, but picked out at a "higher level"? [Lyons on Fodor]
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson]
Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Type physicalism equates mental kinds with physical kinds [Fodor]
Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 4. Connectionism
Hume has no theory of the co-ordination of the mind [Fodor]
Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor]
Only the labels of nodes have semantic content in connectionism, and they play no role [Fodor]
Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Do new ideas increase the weight of the brain? [Dance]
If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
Lots of physical properties are multiply realisable, so why shouldn't beliefs be? [Fodor]
Most psychological properties seem to be multiply realisable [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor]
The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor]
Connectionism gives no account of how constituents make complex concepts [Fodor]
Associative thinking avoids syntax, but can't preserve sense, reference or truth [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 2. Propositional Attitudes
Propositional attitudes are propositions presented in a certain way [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor]
Folk psychology explains behaviour by reference to intentional states like belief and desire [Fodor]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality has mental properties - autonomy, productivity, experiment [Fodor]
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 3. Modularity of Mind
Rationality rises above modules [Fodor]
Mental modules are specialised, automatic, and isolated [Fodor, by Okasha]
Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor]
Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor]
Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor]
Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor]
Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor]
Modules make the world manageable [Fodor]
Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor]
Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Ambiguities in English are the classic reason for claiming that we don't think in English [Fodor]
Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor]
Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor]
Since the language of thought is the same for all, it must be something like logical form [Fodor, by Devlin]
Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor]
We must have expressive power BEFORE we learn language [Fodor]
Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 5. Mental Files
Mental representations name things in the world, but also files in our memory [Fodor]
We think in file names [Fodor]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / a. Artificial Intelligence
Is thought a syntactic computation using representations? [Fodor, by Rey]
Frame Problem: how to eliminate most beliefs as irrelevant, without searching them? [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Maybe narrow content is physical, broad content less so [Lyons on Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 2. Ideas
Mental representations are the old 'Ideas', but without images [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
If concept content is reference, then my Twin and I are referring to the same stuff [Fodor]
XYZ (Twin Earth 'water') is an impossibility [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
How could the extrinsic properties of thoughts supervene on their intrinsic properties? [Fodor]
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson]
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands]
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson]
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson]
Truth conditions require a broad concept of content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor]
Concepts aren't linked to stuff; they are what is caused by stuff [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor]
Knowing the cause of a thought is almost knowing its content [Fodor]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
Is content basically information, fixed externally? [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Nobody knows how concepts are acquired [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
If concept-learning is hypothesis-testing, that needs innate concepts to get started [Fodor, by Margolis/Laurence]
Fodor is now less keen on the innateness of concepts [Fodor, by Lowe]
Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor]
We have an innate capacity to form a concept, once we have grasped the stereotype [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / a. Concepts as representations
It is essential to the concept CAT that it be satisfied by cats [Fodor]
Having a concept isn't a pragmatic matter, but being able to think about the concept [Fodor]
Concepts have two sides; they are files that face thought, and also face subject-matter [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / b. Concepts as abilities
In the information view, concepts are potentials for making distinctions [Fodor]
I prefer psychological atomism - that concepts are independent of epistemic capacities [Fodor]
Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor]
For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor]
Cartesians put concept individuation before concept possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference [Fodor]
If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers [Fodor]
Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
You can't think 'brown dog' without thinking 'brown' and 'dog' [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Definable concepts have constituents, which are necessary, individuate them, and demonstrate possession [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / d. Concepts as prototypes
Many concepts lack prototypes, and complex prototypes aren't built from simple ones [Fodor]
Maybe stereotypes are a stage in concept acquisition (rather than a by-product) [Fodor]
One stereotype might be a paradigm for two difference concepts [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / f. Theory theory of concepts
The theory theory can't actually tell us what concepts are [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / g. Conceptual atomism
For the referential view of thought, the content of a concept is just its reference [Fodor]
Compositionality requires that concepts be atomic [Fodor]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
Abstractionism claims that instances provide criteria for what is shared [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson]
Semantic externalism says the concept 'elm' needs no further beliefs or inferences [Fodor]
If meaning is information, that establishes the causal link between the state of the world and our beliefs [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor]
It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson]
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames]
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart]
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson]
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson]
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson]
Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor]
To know the content of a thought is to know what would make it true [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson]
The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / a. Sentence meaning
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
For holists no two thoughts are ever quite the same, which destroys faith in meaning [Fodor]
If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor]
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
'Inferential-role semantics' says meaning is determined by role in inference [Fodor]
Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is claimed that reference doesn't fix sense (Jocasta), and sense doesn't fix reference (Twin Earth) [Fodor]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Broad semantics holds that the basic semantic properties are truth and denotation [Fodor]
English has no semantic theory, just associations between sentences and thoughts [Fodor]
Semantics (esp. referential semantics) allows inferences from utterances to the world [Fodor]
Semantics relates to the world, so it is never just psychological [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson]
The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan]
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A]
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson]
Externalist semantics are necessary to connect the contents of beliefs with how the world is [Fodor]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 6. Propositions Critique
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson]
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson]
The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson]
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button]
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson]
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson]
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / d. Metaphor
Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson]
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson]
We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson]
Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson]
20. Action / A. Definition of Action / 2. Duration of an Action
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R]
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / b. Types of intention
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / c. Reducing intentions
Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / a. Acting on beliefs
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
Before you can plan action, you must decide on the truth of your estimate of success [Fodor]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M]
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson]
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R]
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe]
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta]
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson]
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos]
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
Laws are true generalisations which support counterfactuals and are confirmed by instances [Fodor]