43 ideas
9271 | Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray] |
18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
3523 | Shadows are supervenient on their objects, but not reducible [Maslin] |
3517 | 'Ontology' means 'study of things which exist' [Maslin] |
18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
9275 | Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray] |
3538 | Analogy to other minds is uncheckable, over-confident and chauvinistic [Maslin] |
3540 | If we are brains then we never meet each other [Maslin] |
3518 | I'm not the final authority on my understanding of maths [Maslin] |
9276 | The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray] |
3530 | Denial of purely mental causation will lead to epiphenomenalism [Maslin] |
3520 | Token-identity removes the explanatory role of the physical [Maslin] |
9278 | Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray] |
3528 | Causality may require that a law is being followed [Maslin] |
3525 | Strict laws make causation logically necessary [Maslin] |
3527 | Strict laws allow no exceptions and are part of a closed system [Maslin] |
9280 | Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray] |
23061 | Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray] |
23057 | Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray] |
23056 | Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray] |
9279 | What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray] |
23055 | Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray] |
9272 | Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray] |
23058 | Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray] |