36 ideas
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 8250 | So-called 'free logic' operates without existence assumptions [Meinong, by George/Van Evra] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 8719 | There can be impossible and contradictory objects, if they can have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 8971 | There are objects of which it is true that there are no such objects [Meinong] |
| 8718 | Meinong says an object need not exist, but must only have properties [Meinong, by Friend] |
| 7756 | Meinong said all objects of thought (even self-contradictions) have some sort of being [Meinong, by Lycan] |
| 15781 | The objects of knowledge are far more numerous than objects which exist [Meinong] |
| 14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
| 14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
| 14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
| 14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
| 14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |