Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Adolph Rami, Michael Hallett and Stephen Boulter

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22138 Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18335 There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami]
18334 The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18339 The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18333 Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
18342 Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18340 It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
18341 Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / d. Being makes truths
18346 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami]
18345 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
18343 Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 11. Truthmaking and Correspondence
18338 Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
18337 Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
18347 Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
18350 Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17833 The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M]
17834 Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17837 Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
17836 The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
18336 Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
22134 Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
10938 The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
10940 An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
10939 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
10934 Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
10933 Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
22150 Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
10932 If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22139 Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22136 Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
22135 Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
22152 Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22156 The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]