42 ideas
| 18335 | There are five problems which the truth-maker theory might solve [Rami] |
| 18334 | The truth-maker idea is usually justified by its explanatory power, or intuitive appeal [Rami] |
| 18339 | The truth-making relation can be one-to-one, or many-to-many [Rami] |
| 18333 | Central idea: truths need truthmakers; and possibly all truths have them, and makers entail truths [Rami] |
| 18342 | Most theorists say that truth-makers necessitate their truths [Rami] |
| 18340 | It seems best to assume different kinds of truth-maker, such as objects, facts, tropes, or events [Rami] |
| 18341 | Truth-makers seem to be states of affairs (plus optional individuals), or individuals and properties [Rami] |
| 18346 | 'Truth supervenes on being' only gives necessary (not sufficient) conditions for contingent truths [Rami] |
| 18345 | 'Truth supervenes on being' avoids entities as truth-makers for negative truths [Rami] |
| 18343 | Maybe a truth-maker also works for the entailments of the given truth [Rami] |
| 18338 | Truth-making is usually internalist, but the correspondence theory is externalist [Rami] |
| 18337 | Correspondence theories assume that truth is a representation relation [Rami] |
| 18347 | Deflationist truth is an infinitely disjunctive property [Rami] |
| 18350 | Truth-maker theorists should probably reject the converse Barcan formula [Rami] |
| 18336 | Internal relations depend either on the existence of the relata, or on their properties [Rami] |
| 11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
| 11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
| 11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
| 10938 | The extremes of essentialism are that all properties are essential, or only very trivial ones [Rami] |
| 11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
| 11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
| 11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
| 11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
| 10940 | An 'individual essence' is possessed uniquely by a particular object [Rami] |
| 11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
| 11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
| 10939 | 'Sortal essentialism' says being a particular kind is what is essential [Rami] |
| 10934 | Unlosable properties are not the same as essential properties [Rami] |
| 11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
| 11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
| 10933 | Physical possibility is part of metaphysical possibility which is part of logical possibility [Rami] |
| 10932 | If it is possible 'for all I know' then it is 'epistemically possible' [Rami] |
| 11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
| 11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
| 11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
| 11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
| 11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
| 11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
| 11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |
| 1466 | Claims about God don't seem to claim or deny anything tangible, so evidence is irrelevant [Flew, by PG] |
| 1465 | You can't claim a patch of land is tended by a 'gardener' if there is no evidence, and all counter-evidence is rejected [Flew, by PG] |
| 1467 | Religious people seem unwilling to accept any evidence that God does not love us, so their claim is unfalsifiable [Flew, by PG] |