Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Aeschylus, Thomas Nagel and Seneca the Younger

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112 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
Wisdom does not lie in books, and unread people can also become wise [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca]
Wise people escape necessity by willing it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel]
Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Philosophy aims at happiness [Seneca]
What philosophy offers humanity is guidance [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 3. Analysis of Preconditions
That something is a necessary condition of something else doesn't mean it caused it [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Even philosophers have got bogged down in analysing tiny bits of language [Seneca]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel]
Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel]
Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel]
We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 2. Pragmatic justification
Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
To the four causes Plato adds a fifth, the idea which guided the event [Seneca]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel]
Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel]
The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
If everything can be measured, try measuring the size of a man's soul [Seneca]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / a. Preconditions for ethics
Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / a. Idealistic ethics
The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Trouble in life comes from copying other people, which is following convention instead of reason [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / d. Health
Humans acquired the concept of virtue from an analogy with bodily health and strength [Seneca, by Allen]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
We know death, which is like before birth; ceasing to be and never beginning are the same [Seneca]
Living is nothing wonderful; what matters is to die well [Seneca]
It is as silly to lament ceasing to be as to lament not having lived in the remote past [Seneca]
We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Is anything sweeter than valuing yourself more when you find you are loved? [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness does not produce happiness; to live for yourself, live for others [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / f. Good as pleasure
Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
To be always happy is to lack knowledge of one half of nature [Seneca]
A man is as unhappy as he has convinced himself he is [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / b. Eudaimonia
Life is like a play - it is the quality that matters, not the length [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
We are scared of death - except when we are immersed in pleasure! [Seneca]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The whole point of pleasure-seeking is novelty, and abandoning established ways [Seneca]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 6. Game Theory
Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / b. Living naturally
Nature doesn't give us virtue; we must unremittingly pursue it, as a training and an art [Seneca]
Living contrary to nature is like rowing against the stream [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca]
Character is ruined by not looking back over our pasts, since the future rests on the past [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca]
Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It's no good winning lots of fights, if you are then conquered by your own temper [Seneca]
Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca]
Excessive curiosity is a form of intemperance [Seneca]
Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / a. External goods
Nothing bad can happen to a good man [Seneca]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca]
If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca]
There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel]
As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel]
If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel]
We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel]
In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 4. Original Position / c. Difference principle
An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
To govern used to mean to serve, not to rule; rulers did not test their powers over those who bestowed it [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / c. Liberal equality
A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel]
The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel]
In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel]
Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel]
Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
The 'Eumenides' of Aeschylus shows blood feuds replaced by law [Aeschylus, by Grayling]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
One joy of learning is making teaching possible [Seneca]
Both teachers and pupils should aim at one thing - the improvement of the pupil [Seneca]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide may be appropriate even when it is not urgent, if there are few reasons against it [Seneca]
If we control our own death, no one has power over us [Seneca]
Sometimes we have a duty not to commit suicide, for those we love [Seneca]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
The ocean changes in volume in proportion to the attraction of the moon [Seneca]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Does time exist on its own? Did anything precede it? Did it pre-exist the cosmos? [Seneca]