Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agathon, Machamer,P/Darden,L/Craver,C and D.H. Mellor

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
10365 We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
16554 Activities have place, rate, duration, entities, properties, modes, direction, polarity, energy and range [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
8568 A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8564 There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
16556 Penicillin causes nothing; the cause is what penicillin does [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
8566 We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
8565 If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 2. Necessity as Primitive
74 Even God could not undo what has been done [Agathon]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
16562 We understand something by presenting its low-level entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
16563 The explanation is not the regularity, but the activity sustaining it [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / h. Explanations by function
16555 Functions are not properties of objects, they are activities contributing to mechanisms [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
16529 Mechanisms are systems organised to produce regular change [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16530 A mechanism explains a phenomenon by showing how it was produced [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16553 Our account of mechanism combines both entities and activities [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16559 Descriptions of explanatory mechanisms have a bottom level, where going further is irrelevant [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
16528 Mechanisms are not just push-pull systems [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / b. Ultimate explanation
16564 There are four types of bottom-level activities which will explain phenomena [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
16561 We can abstract by taking an exemplary case and ignoring the detail [Machamer/Darden/Craver]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
4785 Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / e. Probabilistic causation
8567 Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor]
8408 Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
16558 Laws of nature have very little application in biology [Machamer/Darden/Craver]