Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Isaiah and Francis Hutcheson

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
Let us reason together, saith the Lord [Isaiah]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Reason is our power of finding out true propositions [Hutcheson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
Can't the moral sense make mistakes, as the other senses do? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a pleasant sensation, or continued state of such sensations [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
You can't form moral rules without an end, which needs feelings and a moral sense [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The world is established, and cannot be moved [Isaiah]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
Beside me there is no God [Isaiah]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
We are asked to follow God's ends because he is our benefactor, but why must we do that? [Hutcheson]
Why may God not have a superior moral sense very similar to ours? [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]