Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Agrippa, Theodosius and Harold Noonan

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16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
All reasoning endlessly leads to further reasoning (Mode 12) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Proofs often presuppose the thing to be proved (Mode 15) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
Reasoning needs arbitrary faith in preliminary hypotheses (Mode 14) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
All discussion is full of uncertainty and contradiction (Mode 11) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
It is controversial whether only 'numerical identity' allows two things to be counted as one [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
I could have died at five, but the summation of my adult stages could not [Noonan]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Stage theorists accept four-dimensionalism, but call each stage a whole object [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Problems about identity can't even be formulated without the concept of identity [Noonan]
Identity is usually defined as the equivalence relation satisfying Leibniz's Law [Noonan]
Identity definitions (such as self-identity, or the smallest equivalence relation) are usually circular [Noonan]
Identity can only be characterised in a second-order language [Noonan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Indiscernibility is basic to our understanding of identity and distinctness [Noonan]
Leibniz's Law must be kept separate from the substitutivity principle [Noonan]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Agrippa's Trilemma: justification is infinite, or ends arbitrarily, or is circular [Agrippa, by Williams,M]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Everything is perceived in relation to another thing (Mode 13) [Agrippa, by Diog. Laertius]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / b. Scepticism of other minds
If we can't know minds, we can't know if Pyrrho was a sceptic [Theodosius, by Diog. Laertius]