9 ideas
| 9217 | Modern empirical metaphysics focuses on ontological commitments of discourse, or on presuppositions [Loux/Zimmerman] |
| 14637 | Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael] |
| 14636 | Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael] |
| 14640 | Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael] |
| 14638 | Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael] |
| 21513 | We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing] |
| 21497 | If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing] |
| 18671 | The ground for an attitude is not a thing's 'goodness', but its concrete characteristics [Ewing] |
| 14639 | Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael] |