Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alan McMichael, M.R. Ayers and Hannah Arendt

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

22 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
17518 Counting 'coin in this box' may have coin as the unit, with 'in this box' merely as the scope [Ayers]
17516 If counting needs a sortal, what of things which fall under two sortals? [Ayers]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
17520 Events do not have natural boundaries, and we have to set them [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
17519 To express borderline cases of objects, you need the concept of an 'object' [Ayers]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
17510 Speakers need the very general category of a thing, if they are to think about it [Ayers]
17522 We use sortals to classify physical objects by the nature and origin of their unity [Ayers]
17515 Seeing caterpillar and moth as the same needs continuity, not identity of sortal concepts [Ayers]
17511 Recognising continuity is separate from sortals, and must precede their use [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
17517 Could the same matter have more than one form or principle of unity? [Ayers]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17513 If there are two objects, then 'that marble, man-shaped object' is ambiguous [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
14637 Only individuals have essences, so numbers (as a higher type based on classes) lack them [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
17523 Sortals basically apply to individuals [Ayers]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14636 Essences are the interesting necessary properties resulting from a thing's own peculiar nature [McMichael]
14640 Maybe essential properties have to be intrinsic, as well as necessary? [McMichael]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14638 Essentialism is false, because it implies the existence of necessary singular propositions [McMichael]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
17521 You can't have the concept of a 'stage' if you lack the concept of an object [Ayers]
17514 Temporal 'parts' cannot be separated or rearranged [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
17509 Some say a 'covering concept' completes identity; others place the concept in the reference [Ayers]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
17512 If diachronic identities need covering concepts, why not synchronic identities too? [Ayers]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
20580 The ideal subject for dictators is not a fanatic, but someone who can't distinguish true from false [Arendt, by Oksala]
20579 Modern totalitarianism results from lack of social ties or shared goals [Arendt, by Oksala]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
14639 Individuals enter into laws only through their general qualities and relations [McMichael]