Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Camus, A.R. Lacey and Philip Kitcher

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53 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
Intuitionists rely on assertability instead of truth, but assertability relies on truth [Kitcher]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
Classical logic is our preconditions for assessing empirical evidence [Kitcher]
I believe classical logic because I was taught it and use it, but it could be undermined [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Kitcher says maths is an idealisation of the world, and our operations in dealing with it [Kitcher, by Resnik]
Mathematical a priorism is conceptualist, constructivist or realist [Kitcher]
The interest or beauty of mathematics is when it uses current knowledge to advance undestanding [Kitcher]
The 'beauty' or 'interest' of mathematics is just explanatory power [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers stand to measurement as natural numbers stand to counting [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / j. Complex numbers
Complex numbers were only accepted when a geometrical model for them was found [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A one-operation is the segregation of a single object [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The old view is that mathematics is useful in the world because it describes the world [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
With infinitesimals, you divide by the time, then set the time to zero [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 2. Intuition of Mathematics
Mathematical intuition is not the type platonism needs [Kitcher]
If mathematics comes through intuition, that is either inexplicable, or too subjective [Kitcher]
Intuition is no basis for securing a priori knowledge, because it is fallible [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
Mathematical knowledge arises from basic perception [Kitcher]
My constructivism is mathematics as an idealization of collecting and ordering objects [Kitcher]
We derive limited mathematics from ordinary things, and erect powerful theories on their basis [Kitcher]
The defenders of complex numbers had to show that they could be expressed in physical terms [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Analyticity avoids abstract entities, but can there be truth without reference? [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / a. Constructivism
Arithmetic is an idealizing theory [Kitcher]
Arithmetic is made true by the world, but is also made true by our constructions [Kitcher]
We develop a language for correlations, and use it to perform higher level operations [Kitcher]
Constructivism is ontological (that it is the work of an agent) and epistemological (knowable a priori) [Kitcher]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / c. Conceptualism
Conceptualists say we know mathematics a priori by possessing mathematical concepts [Kitcher]
If meaning makes mathematics true, you still need to say what the meanings refer to [Kitcher]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / b. Need for abstracta
Abstract objects were a bad way of explaining the structure in mathematics [Kitcher]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
Many necessities are inexpressible, and unknowable a priori [Kitcher]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 2. A Priori Contingent
Knowing our own existence is a priori, but not necessary [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
A priori knowledge comes from available a priori warrants that produce truth [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
In long mathematical proofs we can't remember the original a priori basis [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
Knowledge is a priori if the experience giving you the concepts thus gives you the knowledge [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
We have some self-knowledge a priori, such as knowledge of our own existence [Kitcher]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Maybe 'sense-data' just help us to talk about unusual perceptual situations [Lacey]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Where do sense-data begin or end? Can they change? What sort of thing are they? [Lacey]
Some claim sense-data are public, and are parts of objects [Lacey]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
A 'warrant' is a process which ensures that a true belief is knowledge [Kitcher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
If experiential can defeat a belief, then its justification depends on the defeater's absence [Kitcher, by Casullo]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation trades off accuracy for simplicity, in varying degrees [Kitcher]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus]
Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus]
Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus]