Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Camus, H.A. Prichard and Duncan Pritchard

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / d. Philosophy as puzzles
In philosophy the truth can only be reached via the ruins of the false [Prichard]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
My modus ponens might be your modus tollens [Pritchard,D]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
An improbable lottery win can occur in a nearby possible world [Pritchard,D]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 2. Common Sense Certainty
Moore begs the question, or just offers another view, or uses 'know' wrongly [Pritchard,D, by PG]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / c. Knowledge closure
We can have evidence for seeing a zebra, but no evidence for what is entailed by that [Pritchard,D]
Favouring: an entailment will give better support for the first belief than reason to deny the second [Pritchard,D]
Maybe knowledge just needs relevant discriminations among contrasting cases [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Epistemic internalism usually says justification must be accessible by reflection [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / b. Pro-externalism
Externalism is better than internalism in dealing with radical scepticism [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / c. Disjunctivism
Disjunctivism says perceptual justification must be both factual and known by the agent [Pritchard,D]
Metaphysical disjunctivism says normal perceptions and hallucinations are different experiences [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
Epistemic externalism struggles to capture the idea of epistemic responsibility [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
We assess error against background knowledge, but that is just what radical scepticism challenges [Pritchard,D]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Radical scepticism is merely raised, and is not a response to worrying evidence [Pritchard,D]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
The 'Ethics' is disappointing, because it fails to try to justify our duties [Prichard]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / c. Particularism
The mistake is to think we can prove what can only be seen directly in moral thinking [Prichard]
I see the need to pay a debt in a particular instance, and any instance will do [Prichard]
The complexities of life make it almost impossible to assess morality from a universal viewpoint [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Virtues won't generate an obligation, so it isn't a basis for morality [Prichard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
We feel obligations to overcome our own failings, and these are not relations to other people [Prichard]
Seeing the goodness of an effect creates the duty to produce it, not the desire [Prichard]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
If pain were instrinsically wrong, it would be immoral to inflict it on ourselves [Prichard]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus]
If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus]
Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus]