70 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
7460 | The great moments are the death of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and Romanticism [Berlin, by Watson] |
7662 | Romanticism is the greatest change in the consciousness of the West [Berlin] |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
24069 | Much metaphysical debate concerns what is fundamental, rather than what exists [Koslicki] |
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
17311 | Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
13258 | The 'aggregative' objections says mereology gets existence and location of objects wrong [Koslicki] |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
13288 | Consequence is truth-preserving, either despite substitutions, or in all interpretations [Koslicki] |
14506 | 'Roses are red; therefore, roses are colored' seems truth-preserving, but not valid in a system [Koslicki] |
17435 | Objects do not naturally form countable units [Koslicki] |
17433 | We can still count squares, even if they overlap [Koslicki] |
17439 | There is no deep reason why we count carrots but not asparagus [Koslicki] |
17434 | We struggle to count branches and waves because our concepts lack clear boundaries [Koslicki] |
17312 | It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki] |
14505 | Some questions concern mathematical entities, rather than whole structures [Koslicki] |
17314 | The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki] |
17436 | We talk of snow as what stays the same, when it is a heap or drift or expanse [Koslicki] |
13289 | Structures have positions, constituent types and number, and some invariable parts [Koslicki] |
14501 | 'Categorical' properties exist in the actual world, and 'hypothetical' properties in other worlds [Koslicki] |
14495 | I aim to put the notion of structure or form back into the concepts of part, whole and object [Koslicki] |
13264 | If a whole is just a structure, a dinner party wouldn't need the guests to turn up [Koslicki] |
24065 | Structured wholes are united by the teamwork needed for their capacities [Koslicki] |
14497 | The clay is just a part of the statue (its matter); the rest consists of its form or structure [Koslicki] |
13280 | Statue and clay differ in modal and temporal properties, and in constitution [Koslicki] |
24066 | The form explains kind, structure, unity and activity [Koslicki] |
14496 | Structure or form are right at the centre of modern rigorous modes of enquiry [Koslicki] |
13279 | There are at least six versions of constitution being identity [Koslicki] |
14498 | For three-dimensionalist parthood must be a three-place relation, including times [Koslicki] |
13283 | The parts may be the same type as the whole, like a building made of buildings [Koslicki] |
13266 | Wholes in modern mereology are intended to replace sets, so they closely resemble them [Koslicki] |
14500 | Wholes are entities distinct from their parts, and have different properties [Koslicki] |
13281 | Wholes are not just their parts; a whole is an entity distinct from the proper parts [Koslicki] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
17313 | Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
24067 | Hylomorphic compounds need an individual form for transworld identity [Koslicki] |
17309 | For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki] |
17315 | We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
17317 | A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
17316 | We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki] |
7665 | Most Enlightenment thinkers believed that virtue consists ultimately in knowledge [Berlin] |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
7676 | If we are essentially free wills, authenticity and sincerity are the highest virtues [Berlin] |
7664 | The Greeks have no notion of obligation or duty [Berlin] |
7677 | Central to existentialism is the romantic idea that there is nothing to lean on [Berlin] |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
20544 | Berlin distinguishes 'negative' and 'positive' liberty, and rejects the latter [Berlin, by Swift] |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |
14504 | The Kripke/Putnam approach to natural kind terms seems to give them excessive stability [Koslicki] |
13285 | Natural kinds support inductive inferences, from previous samples to the next one [Koslicki] |
13287 | Concepts for species are either intrinsic structure, or relations like breeding or ancestry [Koslicki] |
13284 | Should vernacular classifications ever be counted as natural kind terms? [Koslicki] |
13286 | There are apparently no scientific laws concerning biological species [Koslicki] |
7663 | Judaism and Christianity views are based on paternal, family and tribal relations [Berlin] |