Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Camus, Jerrold J. Katz and Bernecker / Dretske

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Most of philosophy begins where science leaves off [Katz]
Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus]
Traditionally philosophy is an a priori enquiry into general truths about reality [Katz]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
'Real' maths objects have no causal role, no determinate reference, and no abstract/concrete distinction [Katz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
We don't have a clear enough sense of meaning to pronounce some sentences meaningless or just analytic [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Experience cannot teach us why maths and logic are necessary [Katz]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Structuralists see meaning behaviouristically, and Chomsky says nothing about it [Katz]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
It is generally accepted that sense is defined as the determiner of reference [Katz]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Sense determines meaning and synonymy, not referential properties like denotation and truth [Katz]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Sentences are abstract types (like musical scores), not individual tokens [Katz]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus]
If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus]
Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus]