35 ideas
9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
16050 | The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare] |
9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
7258 | The forefather of modern intuitionism is Richard Price [Price,R, by Dancy,J] |
2705 | How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare] |
2712 | You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare] |
2706 | Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare] |
2709 | Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare] |
2704 | If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare] |
2855 | In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B] |
22331 | Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock] |
22484 | Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot] |
4125 | Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B] |
4126 | If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare] |
4127 | If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare] |
22483 | A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare] |
2703 | Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare] |
2707 | If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare] |
2708 | An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare] |
2711 | Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare] |
9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
4360 | By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare] |
9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
2710 | Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare] |
6449 | The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel] |
9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |