Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Casullo, Cappelen,H/Dever,Josh and Judith (Jarvis) Thomson

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36 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts is a crazy doctrine, because it entails constantly creating stuff ex nihilo [Thomson, by Koslicki]
How can point-duration slices of people have beliefs or desires? [Thomson]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
It can't be murder for a mother to perform an abortion on herself to save her own life [Thomson]
A newly fertilized ovum is no more a person than an acorn is an oak tree [Thomson]
Maybe abortion can be justified despite the foetus having full human rights [Thomson, by Foot]
The foetus is safe in the womb, so abortion initiates its death, with the mother as the agent. [Foot on Thomson]
The right to life does not bestow the right to use someone else's body to support that life [Thomson]
The right to life is not a right not to be killed, but not to be killed unjustly [Thomson]
Is someone's right to life diminished if they were conceived by a rape? [Thomson]
No one is morally required to make huge sacrifices to keep someone else alive for nine months [Thomson]