Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Albert Casullo, Karen Bennett and H. Paul Grice

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The greatest philosophers are methodical; it is what makes them great [Grice]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Maybe modal sentences cannot be true or false [Casullo]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but we must take care with misleading ones [Grice, by Edgington]
The odd truth table for material conditionals is explained by conversational conventions [Grice, by Fisher]
Conditionals might remain truth-functional, despite inappropriate conversational remarks [Edgington on Grice]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Conditionals are truth-functional, but unassertable in tricky cases? [Grice, by Read]
A person can be justified in believing a proposition, though it is unreasonable to actually say it [Grice, by Edgington]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 1. A Priori Necessary
If the necessary is a priori, so is the contingent, because the same evidence is involved [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
Epistemic a priori conditions concern either the source, defeasibility or strength [Casullo]
The main claim of defenders of the a priori is that some justifications are non-experiential [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
Analysis of the a priori by necessity or analyticity addresses the proposition, not the justification [Casullo]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 10. A Priori as Subjective
Maybe imagination is the source of a priori justification [Casullo]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / c. Defeasibility
'Overriding' defeaters rule it out, and 'undermining' defeaters weaken in [Casullo]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]
Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]
We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
Grice said patterns of use are often semantically irrelevant, because it is a pragmatic matter [Grice, by Glock]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / b. Implicature
Grice's maxim of quality says do not assert what you believe to be false [Grice, by Magidor]
Grice's maxim of manner requires one to be as brief as possible [Grice, by Magidor]
Key conversational maxims are 'quality' (assert truth) and 'quantity' (leave nothing out) [Grice, by Read]
Grice's maxim of quantity says be sufficiently informative [Grice, by Magidor]