134 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
16664 | Everything that exists is either a substance or an accident [Albert of Saxony] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
16703 | God could make a successive thing so that previous parts cease to exist [Albert of Saxony] |
16699 | Successive entities just need parts to succeed one another, without their existence [Albert of Saxony] |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
16570 | Elements are found last in dismantling bodies, and first in generating them [Albert of Saxony] |
15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |