34 ideas
8472 | Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein] |
8476 | Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein] |
8480 | S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein] |
8474 | Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein] |
8465 | Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein] |
8452 | Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein] |
8475 | The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein] |
8454 | The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein] |
8473 | The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein] |
8458 | Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein] |
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
14963 | Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
8457 | The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein] |
8477 | People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein] |
8471 | Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein] |
8484 | If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein] |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |
20712 | God is 'eternal' either by being non-temporal, or by enduring forever [Davies,B] |
20701 | Can God be good, if he has not maximised goodness? [Davies,B] |
20702 | The goodness of God may be a higher form than the goodness of moral agents [Davies,B] |
20703 | How could God have obligations? What law could possibly impose them? [Davies,B] |
20694 | 'Natural theology' aims to prove God to anyone (not just believers) by reason or argument [Davies,B] |
20706 | A distinct cause of the universe can't be material (which would be part of the universe) [Davies,B] |
20707 | The universe exhibits design either in its sense of purpose, or in its regularity [Davies,B] |
20708 | If God is an orderly being, he cannot be the explanation of order [Davies,B] |
20710 | Maybe an abnormal state of mind is needed to experience God? [Davies,B] |
20711 | A believer can experience the world as infused with God [Davies,B] |
20709 | The experiences of God are inconsistent, not universal, and untestable [Davies,B] |
20697 | One does not need a full understanding of God in order to speak of God [Davies,B] |
20699 | Paradise would not contain some virtues, such as courage [Davies,B] |