Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alex Orenstein, Simon Blackburn and Roderick Firth

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25 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8472 Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable) [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8476 Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 4. Alethic Modal Logic
8480 S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p' [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
8474 Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete [Orenstein]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
8465 Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
8452 Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims [Orenstein]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
8454 The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc. [Orenstein]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
8473 The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic [Orenstein]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
8458 Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism [Orenstein]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
19284 Asserting a necessity just expresses our inability to imagine it is false [Blackburn]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
14629 If we are told the source of necessity, this seems to be a regress if the source is not already necessary [Blackburn]
14529 If something underlies a necessity, is that underlying thing necessary or contingent? [Blackburn, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
6451 Visual sense data are an inner picture show which represents the world [Blackburn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
6493 We are not conscious of pure liquidity, but of the liquidity of water [Firth]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
2866 A true belief might be based on a generally reliable process that failed on this occasion [Blackburn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
8457 The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs [Orenstein]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 10. Denial of Meanings
8477 People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference [Orenstein]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
8471 Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way [Orenstein]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
8484 If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions [Orenstein]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
23996 Akrasia is intelligible in hindsight, when we revisit our previous emotions [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
11911 Some philosophers always want more from morality; for others, nature is enough [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2864 The main objection to intuitionism in ethics is that intuition is a disguise for prejudice or emotion [Blackburn]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2865 Critics of prescriptivism observe that it is consistent to accept an ethical verdict but refuse to be bound by it [Blackburn]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
23223 The word 'respect' ranges from mere non-interference to the highest levels of reverence [Blackburn]