165 ideas
20388 | 'Necessary' conditions are requirements, and 'sufficient' conditions are guarantees [Davies,S] |
6779 | Instrumentalists say distinctions between observation and theory vanish with ostensive definition [Bird] |
15784 | The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan] |
15787 | Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan] |
20389 | A definition of a thing gives all the requirements which add up to a guarantee of it [Davies,S] |
20391 | Feminists warn that ideologies use timeless objective definitions as a tool of repression [Davies,S] |
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
6548 | Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan] |
7755 | Singular terms refer, using proper names, definite descriptions, singular personal pronouns, demonstratives, etc. [Lycan] |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
6531 | Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan] |
6532 | Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan] |
6534 | One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan] |
5500 | Biologists see many organic levels, 'abstract' if seen from below, 'structural' if seen from above [Lycan] |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
6780 | Anti-realism is more plausible about laws than about entities and theories [Bird] |
6529 | I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
15792 | Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan] |
5494 | 'Lightning is electric discharge' and 'Phosphorus is Venus' are synthetic a posteriori identities [Lycan] |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
6796 | Subjective probability measures personal beliefs; objective probability measures the chance of an event happening [Bird] |
6797 | Objective probability of tails measures the bias of the coin, not our beliefs about it [Bird] |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
15795 | Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan] |
15796 | Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan] |
15794 | If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan] |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
6549 | I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan] |
6800 | Many philosophers rate justification as a more important concept than knowledge [Bird] |
6786 | As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird] |
6792 | If theories need observation, and observations need theories, how do we start? [Bird] |
6757 | Explanation predicts after the event; prediction explains before the event [Bird] |
6805 | Relativity ousted Newtonian mechanics despite a loss of simplicity [Bird] |
6777 | Realists say their theories involve truth and the existence of their phenomena [Bird] |
6804 | There is no agreement on scientific method - because there is no such thing [Bird] |
6778 | Instrumentalists regard theories as tools for prediction, with truth being irrelevant [Bird] |
6775 | Induction is inference to the best explanation, where the explanation is a law [Bird] |
6791 | If Hume is right about induction, there is no scientific knowledge [Bird] |
6790 | Anything justifying inferences from observed to unobserved must itself do that [Bird] |
6738 | Any conclusion can be drawn from an induction, if we use grue-like predicates [Bird] |
6739 | Several months of observing beech trees supports the deciduous and evergreen hypotheses [Bird] |
6799 | We normally learn natural kinds from laws, but Goodman shows laws require prior natural kinds [Bird] |
6798 | Bayesianism claims to find rationality and truth in induction, and show how science works [Bird] |
6752 | The objective component of explanations is the things that must exist for the explanation [Bird] |
6754 | We talk both of 'people' explaining things, and of 'facts' explaining things [Bird] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
6750 | Explanations are causal, nomic, psychological, psychoanalytic, Darwinian or functional [Bird] |
6761 | Contrastive explanations say why one thing happened but not another [Bird] |
6758 | 'Covering law' explanations only work if no other explanations are to be found [Bird] |
6759 | Livers always accompany hearts, but they don't explain hearts [Bird] |
6756 | Probabilistic-statistical explanations don't entail the explanandum, but makes it more likely [Bird] |
6760 | An operation might reduce the probability of death, yet explain a death [Bird] |
6785 | Inference to the Best Explanation is done with facts, so it has to be realist [Bird] |
6788 | Maybe bad explanations are the true ones, in this messy world [Bird] |
6787 | Which explanation is 'best' is bound to be subjective, and no guide to truth [Bird] |
6751 | Maybe explanation is so subjective that it cannot be a part of science [Bird] |
6543 | Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan] |
6537 | Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan] |
6546 | Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan] |
6547 | The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan] |
17527 | Causation seems to be an innate concept (or acquired very early) [Bird] |
6527 | If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan] |
6528 | In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan] |
6554 | Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan] |
6541 | Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan] |
6545 | If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan] |
5496 | Functionalism has three linked levels: physical, functional, and mental [Lycan] |
6539 | The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan] |
6535 | Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan] |
6533 | Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan] |
5499 | A mental state is a functional realisation of a brain state when it serves the purpose of the organism [Lycan] |
6544 | Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan] |
6530 | We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan] |
6536 | Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan] |
6542 | A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan] |
7768 | The truth conditions theory sees meaning as representation [Lycan] |
7766 | Meaning must be known before we can consider verification [Lycan] |
7763 | It is hard to state a rule of use for a proper name [Lycan] |
7764 | Could I successfully use an expression, without actually understanding it? [Lycan] |
7770 | Truth conditions will come out the same for sentences with 'renate' or 'cordate' [Lycan] |
7773 | A sentence's truth conditions is the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true [Lycan] |
7774 | Possible worlds explain aspects of meaning neatly - entailment, for example, is the subset relation [Lycan] |
20387 | Aesthetic experience involves perception, but also imagination and understanding [Davies,S] |
20385 | The faculty of 'taste' was posited to explain why only some people had aesthetic appreciation [Davies,S] |
20386 | The sublime is negative in awareness of insignificance, and positive in showing understanding [Davies,S] |
20384 | The idea that art forms are linked into a single concept began in the 1740s [Davies,S] |
20390 | Defining art as representation or expression or form were all undermined by the avant-garde [Davies,S] |
20392 | 'Aesthetic functionalism' says art is what is intended to create aesthetic experiences [Davies,S] |
20405 | Music may be expressive by being 'associated' with other emotional words or events [Davies,S] |
20403 | It seems unlikely that sad music expresses a composer's sadness; it takes ages to write [Davies,S] |
20393 | The 'institutional' theory says art is just something appropriately placed in the 'artworld' [Davies,S] |
20402 | Music is too definite to be put into words (not too indefinite!) [Davies,S] |
20395 | The title of a painting can be vital, and the artist decrees who the portrait represents [Davies,S] |
20396 | We must know what the work is meant to be, to evaluate the artist's achievement [Davies,S] |
20399 | Intentionalism says either meaning just is intention, or ('moderate') meaning is successful intention [Davies,S] |
20401 | The meaning is given by the audience's best guess at the author's intentions [Davies,S] |
20397 | If we could perfectly clone the Mona Lisa, the original would still be special [Davies,S] |
20398 | Art that is multiply instanced may require at least one instance [Davies,S] |
20404 | Music isn't just sad because it makes the listener feel sad [Davies,S] |
22704 | Immorality may or may not be an artistic defect [Davies,S] |
22705 | If the depiction of evil is glorified, that is an artistic flaw [Davies,S] |
22707 | It is an artistic defect if excessive moral outrage distorts the story, and narrows our sympathies [Davies,S] |
22706 | A work which seeks approval for immorality, but alienates the audience, is a failure [Davies,S] |
6538 | We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan] |
5501 | People are trying to explain biological teleology in naturalistic causal terms [Lycan] |
6776 | Natural kinds are those that we use in induction [Bird] |
6767 | Rubies and sapphires are both corundum, with traces of metals varying their colours [Bird] |
6768 | Tin is not one natural kind, but appears to be 21, depending on isotope [Bird] |
6771 | Natural kinds may overlap, or be sub-kinds of one another [Bird] |
6770 | Membership of a purely random collection cannot be used as an explanation [Bird] |
6773 | If F is a universal appearing in a natural law, then Fs form a natural kind [Bird] |
6769 | In the Kripke-Putnam view only nuclear physicists can know natural kinds [Bird] |
6774 | Darwinism suggests that we should have a native ability to detect natural kinds [Bird] |
6764 | Nominal essence of a natural kind is the features that make it fit its name [Bird] |
6766 | Jadeite and nephrite are superficially identical, but have different composition [Bird] |
6808 | Reference to scientific terms is by explanatory role, not by descriptions [Bird] |
17528 | The dispositional account explains causation, as stimulation and manifestation of dispositions [Bird] |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
6753 | Laws are more fundamental in science than causes, and laws will explain causes [Bird] |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
17526 | The counterfactual approach makes no distinction between cause and pre-condition [Bird] |
6762 | Newton's laws cannot be confirmed individually, but only in combinations [Bird] |
6763 | Parapsychology is mere speculation, because it offers no mechanisms for its working [Bird] |
6772 | Existence requires laws, as inertia or gravity are needed for mass or matter [Bird] |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
6746 | There may be many laws, each with only a few instances [Bird] |
6740 | 'All uranium lumps are small' is a law, but 'all gold lumps are small' is not [Bird] |
6741 | There can be remarkable uniformities in nature that are purely coincidental [Bird] |
6742 | A law might have no instances, if it was about things that only exist momentarily [Bird] |
6743 | If laws are just instances, the law should either have gaps, or join the instances arbitrarily [Bird] |
6744 | Where is the regularity in a law predicting nuclear decay? [Bird] |
6747 | Laws cannot explain instances if they are regularities, as something can't explain itself [Bird] |
6748 | Similar appearance of siblings is a regularity, but shared parents is what links them [Bird] |
6749 | We can only infer a true regularity if something binds the instances together [Bird] |
6803 | If we only infer laws from regularities among observations, we can't infer unobservable entities. [Bird] |
6801 | Accidental regularities are not laws, and an apparent regularity may not be actual [Bird] |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
6745 | A regularity is only a law if it is part of a complete system which is simple and strong [Bird] |
6802 | With strange enough predicates, anything could be made out to be a regularity [Bird] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
6789 | If flame colour is characteristic of a metal, that is an empirical claim needing justification [Bird] |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
6551 | 'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan] |
6807 | In Newton mass is conserved, but in Einstein it can convert into energy [Bird] |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |