Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alexander Miller, Joseph Joubert and Crispin Wright

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62 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
Seek wisdom rather than truth; it is easier [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 1. History of Philosophy
We can only learn from philosophers of the past if we accept the risk of major misrepresentation [Wright,C]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
We must think with our entire body and soul [Joubert]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
The love of certainty holds us back in metaphysics [Joubert]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The truths of reason instruct, but they do not illuminate [Joubert]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
The best way to understand a philosophical idea is to defend it [Wright,C]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
The attempt to define numbers by contextual definition has been revived [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Truth consists of having the same idea about something that God has [Joubert]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
An expression refers if it is a singular term in some true sentences [Wright,C, by Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Number theory aims at the essence of natural numbers, giving their nature, and the epistemology [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
One could grasp numbers, and name sizes with them, without grasping ordering [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / d. Counting via concepts
Instances of a non-sortal concept can only be counted relative to a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Wright thinks Hume's Principle is more fundamental to cardinals than the Peano Axioms are [Wright,C, by Heck]
There are five Peano axioms, which can be expressed informally [Wright,C]
Number truths are said to be the consequence of PA - but it needs semantic consequence [Wright,C]
What facts underpin the truths of the Peano axioms? [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Sameness of number is fundamental, not counting, despite children learning that first [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / e. Caesar problem
If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
Number platonism says that natural number is a sortal concept [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 4. Mathematical Empiricism / a. Mathematical empiricism
We can't use empiricism to dismiss numbers, if numbers are our main evidence against empiricism [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Treating numbers adjectivally is treating them as quantifiers [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Wright has revived Frege's discredited logicism [Wright,C, by Benardete,JA]
The Peano Axioms, and infinity of cardinal numbers, are logical consequences of how we explain cardinals [Wright,C]
The aim is to follow Frege's strategy to derive the Peano Axioms, but without invoking classes [Wright,C]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Logicism seemed to fail by Russell's paradox, Gödel's theorems, and non-logical axioms [Wright,C]
The standard objections are Russell's Paradox, non-logical axioms, and Gödel's theorems [Wright,C]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
The idea that 'exist' has multiple senses is not coherent [Wright,C]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
Singular terms in true sentences must refer to objects; there is no further question about their existence [Wright,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Contextually defined abstract terms genuinely refer to objects [Wright,C, by Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
Sortal concepts cannot require that things don't survive their loss, because of phase sortals [Wright,C]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Logical necessity involves a decision about usage, and is non-realist and non-cognitive [Wright,C, by McFetridge]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
To know is to see inside oneself [Joubert]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 2. Imagination
The imagination has made more discoveries than the eye [Joubert]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
A thought is as real as a cannon ball [Joubert]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
'Sortal' concepts show kinds, use indefinite articles, and require grasping identities [Wright,C]
A concept is only a sortal if it gives genuine identity [Wright,C]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / c. Nativist concepts
Where does the bird's idea of a nest come from? [Joubert]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
Entities fall under a sortal concept if they can be used to explain identity statements concerning them [Wright,C]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
If we can establish directions from lines and parallelism, we were already committed to directions [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
A milder claim is that understanding requires some evidence of that understanding [Wright,C]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
Holism cannot give a coherent account of scientific methodology [Wright,C, by Miller,A]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
We can accept Frege's idea of object without assuming that predicates have a reference [Wright,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
He gives his body up to pleasure, but not his soul [Joubert]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
What will you think of pleasures when you no longer enjoy them? [Joubert]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / b. Basis of virtue
Virtue is hard if we are scorned; we need support [Joubert]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
In raising a child we must think of his old age [Joubert]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
We can't exactly conceive virtue without the idea of God [Joubert]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
We cannot speak against Christianity without anger, or speak for it without love [Joubert]