Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alexander Miller, Peter Schulte and Nicholas Rescher

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24 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
7306 If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
22626 Process philosophy insists that processes are not inferior in being to substances [Rescher]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
10650 In the military, persons are parts of parts of large units, but not parts of those large units [Rescher]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
7322 Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
23805 Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7325 Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
23796 Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte]
23793 On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte]
23795 Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte]
23806 Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte]
23804 Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte]
23792 Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 9. Conceptual Role Semantics
23802 Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
23797 Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 11. Teleological Semantics
23799 Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte]
23800 Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte]
18. Thought / C. Content / 12. Informational Semantics
23798 Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
7324 Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 6. Truth-Conditions Semantics
7323 If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
7315 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
7328 The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A]
7329 Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
7333 The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
20365 We only see points in motion, and thereby infer movement [Rescher]