Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alexander Nehamas, Thomas S. Kuhn and Ian McFetridge

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26 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
17950 The logos enables us to track one particular among a network of objects [Nehamas]
17951 A logos may be short, but it contains reference to the whole domain of the object [Nehamas]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12129 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / a. Platonic Forms
17945 Forms are not a theory of universals, but an attempt to explain how predication is possible [Nehamas]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
17946 Only Tallness really is tall, and other inferior tall things merely participate in the tallness [Nehamas]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
17944 'Episteme' is better translated as 'understanding' than as 'knowledge' [Nehamas]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
18076 Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher]
22191 Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
6809 Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 4. Paradigm
22183 Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 5. Commensurability
6162 Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn]
22184 Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha]
7619 Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn]
12128 In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn]