370 ideas
9438 | Maybe analysis seeks the 'nominal essence', and metaphysics seeks the 'real essence' [Locke, by Mumford] |
7653 | I am just an under-labourer, clearing the ground in preparation for knowledge [Locke] |
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
12526 | Opposition to reason is mad [Locke] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
12538 | Genus is a partial conception of species, and species a partial idea of individuals [Locke] |
16797 | Maybe Locke described the real essence of a person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
12573 | Ad Hominem: press a man with the consequences of his own principle [Locke] |
12491 | Asking whether man's will is free is liking asking if sleep is fast or virtue is square [Locke] |
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
12549 | Nothing is so beautiful to the eye as truth is to the mind [Locke] |
12558 | Truth only belongs to mental or verbal propositions [Locke] |
12522 | It is propositions which are true or false, though it is sometimes said of ideas [Locke] |
12523 | If they refer to real substances, 'man' is a true idea and 'centaur' a false one [Locke] |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
12572 | Many people can reason well, yet can't make a syllogism [Locke] |
8084 | Syllogisms are verbal fencing, not discovery [Locke] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
10653 | Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi] |
10648 | Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi] |
10655 | Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi] |
10659 | There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi] |
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
10055 | Mathematical proofs work, irrespective of whether the objects exist [Locke] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
12488 | The idea of 'one' is the simplest, most obvious and most widespread idea [Locke] |
12489 | If there were real infinities, you could add two together, which is ridiculous [Locke] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
12556 | Mathematics is just about ideas, so whether circles exist is irrelevant [Locke] |
7782 | Every simple idea we ever have brings the idea of unity along with it [Locke] |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
8910 | General and universal are not real entities, but useful inventions of the mind, concerning words or ideas [Locke] |
12554 | Existences can only be known by experience [Locke] |
12502 | Comparisons boil down to simple elements of sensation or reflection [Locke] |
12568 | God assures me of the existence of external things [Locke] |
12516 | Obscure simple ideas result from poor senses, brief impressions, or poor memory [Locke] |
12517 | Ideas are uncertain when they are unnamed, because too close to other ideas [Locke] |
13435 | We can't categorise things by their real essences, because these are unknown [Locke] |
12535 | If we discovered real essences, we would still categorise things by the external appearance [Locke] |
13436 | There are no gaps in the continuum of nature, and everything has something closely resembling it [Locke] |
12477 | We get the idea of power from our own actions, and the interaction of external bodies [Locke] |
12490 | Power is active or passive, and has a relation to actions [Locke] |
12521 | We can only know a thing's powers when we have combined it with many things [Locke] |
15974 | The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke] |
15976 | What is the texture - the real essence - which makes substances behave in distinct ways? [Locke] |
15983 | Locke explains powers, but effectively eliminates them with his talk of internal structure [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
6487 | Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke] |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
7717 | All things that exist are particulars [Locke] |
7718 | Universals do not exist, but are useful inventions of the mind, involving words or ideas [Locke] |
12499 | Bodies distinctively have cohesion of parts, and power to communicate motion [Locke] |
1211 | Viewing an object at an instant, we perceive identity when we see it must be that thing and not another [Locke] |
12508 | Living things retain identity through change, by a principle of organisation [Locke] |
12506 | A thing is individuated just by existing at a time and place [Locke] |
12563 | Obviously two bodies cannot be in the same place [Locke] |
12529 | I speak of a 'sortal' name, from the word 'sort' [Locke] |
8546 | Powers are part of our idea of substances [Locke] |
1196 | We can conceive of three sorts of substance: God, finite intelligence, and bodies [Locke] |
12536 | We sort and name substances by nominal and not by real essence [Locke] |
7945 | We think of substance as experienced qualities plus a presumed substratum of support [Locke] |
12485 | We don't know what substance is, and only vaguely know what it does [Locke] |
16796 | Locke may accept coinciding material substances, such as body, man and person [Locke, by Pasnau] |
10661 | 'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi] |
12507 | A mass consists of its atoms, so the addition or removal of one changes its identity [Locke] |
12559 | Complex ideas are collections of qualities we attach to an unknown substratum [Locke] |
10647 | Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi] |
10651 | If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi] |
10649 | 'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi] |
10654 | The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi] |
10658 | Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi] |
12498 | Particular substances are coexisting ideas that seem to flow from a hidden essence [Locke] |
12520 | The best I can make of real essence is figure, size and connection of solid parts [Locke] |
13771 | Real essence is the constitution of the unknown parts of a body which produce its qualities [Locke] |
16038 | Locke may distinguish real essence from internal constitution, claiming the latter is knowable [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12810 | We can conceive an individual without assigning it to a kind [Locke, by Jolley] |
16786 | You can't distinguish individuals without the species as a standard [Locke] |
15992 | Many individuals grouped under one name vary more than some things that have different names [Locke] |
15990 | Every individual thing which exists has an essence, which is its internal constitution [Locke] |
12530 | The less rational view of essences is that they are moulds for kinds of natural thing [Locke] |
12532 | Even real essence depends on a sort, since it is sorts which have the properties [Locke] |
12539 | If every sort has its real essence, one horse, being many sorts, will have many essences [Locke] |
12510 | Not all identity is unity of substance [Locke] |
11155 | Essence is the very being of any thing, whereby it is what it is [Locke] |
12560 | We can only slightly know necessary co-existence of qualities, if they are primary [Locke] |
16787 | Explanatory essence won't do, because it won't distinguish the accidental from the essential [Locke, by Pasnau] |
16028 | Lockean real essence makes a thing what it is, and produces its observable qualities [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12305 | Locke's essences determine the other properties, so the two will change together [Locke, by Copi] |
15985 | It is impossible for two things with the same real essence to differ in properties [Locke] |
12534 | We cannot know what properties are necessary to gold, unless we first know its real essence [Locke] |
13434 | In our ideas, the idea of essence is inseparable from the concept of a species [Locke] |
16035 | If we based species on real essences, the individuals would be as indistinguishable as two circles [Locke] |
16036 | Internal constitution doesn't decide a species; should a watch contain four wheels or five? [Locke] |
12540 | Artificial things like watches and pistols have distinct kinds [Locke] |
12812 | Things have real essences, but we categorise them according to the ideas we receive [Locke] |
16031 | Real essence explains observable qualities, but not what kind of thing it is [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
15646 | If essence is 'nominal', artificial gold (with its surface features) would qualify as 'gold' [Locke, by Eagle] |
12306 | 'Nominal essence' is everything contained in the idea of a particular sort of thing [Locke, by Copi] |
15988 | The observable qualities are never the real essence, since they depend on real essence [Locke] |
15644 | In nominal essence, Locke confuses the set of properties with the abstracted idea of them [Eagle on Locke] |
12537 | To be a nominal essence, a complex idea must exhibit unity [Locke] |
16029 | Locke's real and nominal essence refers back to Aristotle's real and nominal definitions [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12531 | Nominal Essence is the abstract idea to which a name is attached [Locke] |
13433 | Essences relate to sorting words; if you replace those with names, essences vanish [Locke] |
12533 | Real essences are unknown, so only the nominal essence connects things to a species [Locke] |
12557 | Our ideas of substance are based on mental archetypes, but these come from the world [Locke] |
12561 | For 'all gold is malleable' to be necessary, it must be part of gold's nominal essence [Locke] |
12525 | The essence of a triangle is simple; presumably substance essences are similar [Locke] |
13431 | A space between three lines is both the nominal and real essence of a triangle, the source of its properties [Locke] |
13423 | The schools recognised that they don't really know essences, because they couldn't coin names for them [Locke] |
12804 | There are no independent natural kinds - or our classifications have to be subjective [Locke, by Jolley] |
12547 | We know five properties of gold, but cannot use four of them to predict the fifth one [Locke] |
12503 | Identity means that the idea of a thing remains the same over time [Locke] |
12505 | One thing cannot have two beginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning [Locke] |
16795 | Same person, man or substance are different identities, belonging to different ideas [Locke] |
12504 | Two things can't occupy one place and time, which leads us to the idea of self-identity [Locke] |
12553 | Some of our ideas contain relations which we cannot conceive to be absent [Locke] |
10652 | Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi] |
12544 | Our knowledge falls short of the extent of our own ideas [Locke] |
12574 | When two ideas agree in my mind, I cannot refuse to see and know it [Locke] |
15995 | The greatest certainty is knowing our own ideas, and that two ideas are different [Locke] |
12562 | General certainty is only found in ideas [Locke] |
15994 | If it is knowledge, it is certain; if it isn't certain, it isn't knowledge [Locke] |
12569 | Knowledge by senses is less certain than that by intuition or reason, but it is still knowledge [Locke] |
12564 | I am as certain of the thing doubting, as I am of the doubt [Locke] |
7570 | Innate ideas are trivial (if they are just potentials) or absurd (if they claim infants know a lot) [Locke, by Jolley] |
12472 | If the only test of innateness is knowing, then all of our knowledge is innate [Locke] |
7709 | A proposition can't be in the mind if we aren't conscious of it [Locke] |
4018 | Innate ideas were followed up with innate doctrines, which stopped reasoning and made social control possible [Locke] |
7723 | The senses first let in particular ideas, which furnish the empty cabinet [Locke] |
7507 | The mind is white paper, with no writing, or ideas [Locke] |
12474 | The mind is a blank page, on which only experience can write [Locke] |
12518 | The mind cannot produce simple ideas [Locke] |
12478 | A 'quality' is a power to produce an idea in our minds [Locke] |
12481 | Hands can report conflicting temperatures, but not conflicting shapes [Locke] |
12546 | We can't know how primary and secondary qualities connect together [Locke] |
15989 | Colours, smells and tastes are ideas; the secondary qualities have no colour, smell or taste [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
15971 | Secondary qualities are powers of complex primary qualities to produce sensations in us [Locke] |
6725 | Locke believes matter is an inert, senseless substance, with extension, figure and motion [Locke, by Berkeley] |
15982 | Qualities are named as primary if they are needed for scientific explanation [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
12479 | Primary qualities produce simple ideas, such as solidity, extension, motion and number [Locke] |
12480 | Ideas of primary qualities resemble their objects, but those of secondary qualities don't [Locke] |
7049 | In Locke, the primary qualities are also powers [Locke, by Heil] |
15973 | In my view Locke's 'textures' are groups of corpuscles which are powers (rather than 'having' powers) [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
7050 | I suspect that Locke did not actually believe colours are 'in the mind' [Locke, by Heil] |
15979 | Secondary qualities are simply the bare powers of an object [Locke] |
12482 | Molyneux's Question: could a blind man distinguish cube from sphere, if he regained his sight? [Locke] |
7724 | All the ideas written on the white paper of the mind can only come from one place - experience [Locke] |
12527 | Some ideas connect together naturally, while others connect by chance or custom [Locke] |
12555 | The constant link between whiteness and things that produce it is the basis of our knowledge [Locke] |
12542 | Knowledge is just the connection or disagreement of our ideas [Locke] |
16637 | The absolute boundaries of our thought are the ideas we get from senses and the mind [Locke] |
2793 | It is unclear how identity, equality, perfection, God, power and cause derive from experience [Locke, by Dancy,J] |
12543 | Intuition gives us direct and certain knowledge of what is obvious [Locke] |
19517 | Believing without a reason may just be love of your own fantasies [Locke] |
15977 | Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations [Locke] |
2555 | For Locke knowledge relates to objects, not to propositions [Locke, by Rorty] |
10326 | Other men's opinions don't add to our knowledge - even when they are true [Locke] |
6488 | Locke has no patience with scepticism [Locke, by Robinson,H] |
16037 | Locke seems to use real essence for scientific explanation, and substratum for the being of a thing [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
16032 | To explain qualities, Locke invokes primary and secondary qualities, not real essences [Locke, by Jones,J-E] |
12519 | Gold is supposed to have a real essence, from whence its detectable properties flow [Locke] |
12551 | We are satisfied that other men have minds, from their words and actions [Locke] |
12483 | Unlike humans, animals cannot entertain general ideas [Locke] |
5002 | Consciousness is the perception of what passes in a man's own mind [Locke] |
2603 | If we aren't aware that an idea is innate, the concept of innate is meaningless; if we do, all ideas seem innate [Locke] |
2421 | There is nothing illogical about inverted qualia [Locke] |
3522 | The same object might produce violet in one mind and marigold in another [Locke] |
7721 | Locke's view that thoughts are made of ideas asserts the crucial role of imagination [Locke] |
12476 | Every external object or internal idea suggests to us the idea of unity [Locke] |
12501 | The mind can make a unity out of anything, no matter how diverse [Locke] |
9083 | The mind creates abstractions by generalising about appearances of objects, ignoring time or place [Locke] |
7040 | General words represent general ideas, which are abstractions from immediate circumstances [Locke] |
12528 | If a man sees a friend die in a room, he associates the pain with the room [Locke] |
5512 | Locke uses 'self' for a momentary entity, and 'person' for an extended one [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
1202 | A person is intelligent, rational, self-aware, continuous, conscious [Locke] |
1381 | Someone mad then sane is two persons, judging by our laws and punishments [Locke] |
1385 | 'Person' is a term used about responsibility, involving law, and happiness and misery [Locke] |
1372 | Our personal identity must depend on something we are aware of, namely consciousness [Locke] |
1378 | My little finger is part of me if I am conscious of it [Locke] |
5175 | Personal identity is my perceptions, but not my memory, as I forget too much [Ayer on Locke] |
1363 | Locke's theory confusingly tries to unite consciousness and memory [Reid on Locke] |
1368 | Locke mistakes similarity of a memory to its original event for identity [Reid on Locke] |
1373 | Identity over time involves remembering actions just as they happened [Locke] |
1380 | Should we punish people who commit crimes in their sleep? [Locke] |
5511 | For Locke, conscious awareness unifies a person at an instant and over time [Locke, by Martin/Barresi] |
12509 | If the soul individuates a man, and souls are transferable, then a hog could be a man [Locke] |
1376 | Identity must be in consciousness not substance, because it seems transferable [Locke] |
12512 | If someone becomes conscious of Nestor's actions, then he is Nestor [Locke] |
12513 | If a prince's soul entered a cobbler's body, the person would be the prince (and the man the cobbler) [Locke] |
12514 | On Judgement Day, no one will be punished for actions they cannot remember [Locke] |
1397 | Locke sees underlying substance as irrelevant to personal identity [Locke, by Noonan] |
6139 | Locke implies that each thought has two thinkers - me, and 'my' substance [Merricks on Locke] |
5513 | Two persons might have qualitatively identical consciousnesses, so that isn't enough [Kant on Locke] |
1345 | Locke's move from substance to consciousness is a slippery slope [Butler on Locke] |
1197 | No two thoughts at different times can be the same, as they have different beginnings [Locke] |
1364 | Locke confuses the test for personal identity with the thing itself [Reid on Locke] |
12511 | If consciousness is interrupted, and we forget our past selves, are we still the same thinking thing? [Locke] |
1361 | If identity is consciousness, could a person move between bodies or fragment into parts? [Reid on Locke] |
21326 | Locke's memory theory of identity confuses personal identity with the test for it [Reid on Locke] |
1387 | Butler thought Locke's theory was doomed once he rejected mental substance [Perry on Locke] |
12809 | Nothing about me is essential [Locke] |
3792 | We are free to decide not to follow our desires [Locke] |
12494 | Men are not free to will, because they cannot help willing [Locke] |
12492 | Liberty is a power of agents, so can't be an attribute of wills [Locke] |
12493 | A man is free insofar as he can act according to his own preferences [Locke] |
7840 | For all we know, an omnipotent being might have enabled material beings to think [Locke] |
12500 | Thinking without matter and matter that thinks are equally baffling [Locke] |
15996 | We can't begin to conceive what would produce some particular experience within our minds [Locke] |
12552 | Thoughts moving bodies, and bodies producing thoughts, are equally unknowable [Locke] |
6712 | For Locke, abstract ideas are our main superiority of understanding over animals [Locke, by Berkeley] |
12496 | Complex ideas are all resolvable into simple ideas [Locke] |
15967 | The word 'idea' covers thinking best, for imaginings, concepts, and basic experiences [Locke] |
6486 | Ideas are the objects of understanding when we think [Locke] |
12475 | All our ideas derive either from sensation, or from inner reflection [Locke] |
17735 | Simple ideas are produced in us by external things, and they match their appearances [Locke] |
12471 | Innate ideas are nothing, if they are in the mind but we are unaware of them [Locke] |
5827 | A species of thing is an abstract idea, and a word is a sign that refers to the idea [Locke] |
7716 | Words were devised as signs for inner ideas, and their basic meaning is those ideas [Locke] |
7308 | Words stand for the ideas in the mind of him that uses them [Locke] |
12524 | For the correct reference of complex ideas, we can only refer to experts [Locke] |
13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
15991 | Since words are just conventional, we can represent our own ideas with any words we please [Locke] |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
4130 | There couldn't be a moral rule of which a man could not justly demand a reason [Locke] |
12495 | Pursuit of happiness is the highest perfection of intellectual nature [Locke] |
12541 | Morality can be demonstrated, because we know the real essences behind moral words [Locke] |
12473 | We can demand a reason for any moral rule [Locke] |
1386 | A concern for happiness is the inevitable result of consciousness [Locke] |
4019 | Things are good and evil only in reference to pleasure and pain [Locke] |
12515 | Actions are virtuous if they are judged praiseworthy [Locke] |
19906 | All countries are in a mutual state of nature [Locke] |
19882 | We are not created for solitude, but are driven into society by our needs [Locke] |
19864 | In nature men can dispose of possessions and their persons in any way that is possible [Locke] |
19865 | There is no subjection in nature, and all creatures of the same species are equal [Locke] |
19866 | The rational law of nature says we are all equal and independent, and should show mutual respect [Locke] |
19872 | The animals and fruits of the earth belong to mankind [Locke] |
19907 | There is a natural right to inheritance within a family [Locke] |
19863 | Politics is the right to make enforceable laws to protect property and the state, for the common good [Locke] |
5654 | The Second Treatise explores the consequences of the contractual view of the state [Locke, by Scruton] |
19888 | A society only begins if there is consent of all the individuals to join it [Locke] |
6702 | If anyone enjoys the benefits of government (even using a road) they give tacit assent to its laws [Locke] |
19909 | A politic society is created from a state of nature by a unanimous agreement [Locke] |
19910 | A single will creates the legislature, which is duty-bound to preserve that will [Locke] |
19893 | Anyone who enjoys the benefits of a state has given tacit consent to be part of it [Locke] |
19894 | You can only become an actual member of a commonwealth by an express promise [Locke] |
19892 | Children are not born into citizenship of a state [Locke] |
19885 | Absolute monarchy is inconsistent with civil society [Locke] |
19886 | The idea that absolute power improves mankind is confuted by history [Locke] |
19903 | Despotism is arbitrary power to kill, based neither on natural equality, nor any social contract [Locke] |
19905 | People stripped of their property are legitimately subject to despotism [Locke] |
19904 | Legitimate prisoners of war are subject to despotism, because that continues the state of war [Locke] |
19895 | Even the legislature must be preceded by a law which gives it power to make laws [Locke] |
19900 | The executive must not be the legislature, or they may exempt themselves from laws [Locke] |
19902 | Any obstruction to the operation of the legislature can be removed forcibly by the people [Locke] |
19908 | Rebelling against an illegitimate power is no sin [Locke] |
19911 | If legislators confiscate property, or enslave people, they are no longer owed obedience [Locke] |
19901 | The people have supreme power, to depose a legislature which has breached their trust [Locke] |
19887 | Unanimous consent makes a united community, which is then ruled by the majority [Locke] |
19913 | A master forfeits ownership of slaves he abandons [Locke] |
19883 | Slaves captured in a just war have no right to property, so are not part of civil society [Locke] |
19870 | If you try to enslave me, you have declared war on me [Locke] |
19871 | Freedom is not absence of laws, but living under laws arrived at by consent [Locke] |
19880 | All value depends on the labour involved [Locke] |
19884 | There is only a civil society if the members give up all of their natural executive rights [Locke] |
19873 | We all own our bodies, and the work we do is our own [Locke] |
6580 | Locke (and Marx) held that ownership of objects is a natural relation, based on the labour put into it [Locke, by Fogelin] |
20520 | Locke says 'mixing of labour' entitles you to land, as well as nuts and berries [Wolff,J on Locke] |
19875 | A man's labour gives ownership rights - as long as there are fair shares for all [Locke] |
19874 | If a man mixes his labour with something in Nature, he thereby comes to own it [Locke] |
19877 | Fountain water is everyone's, but a drawn pitcher of water has an owner [Locke] |
19876 | Gathering natural fruits gives ownership; the consent of other people is irrelevant [Locke] |
19878 | Mixing labour with a thing bestows ownership - as long as the thing is not wasted [Locke] |
12548 | It is certain that injustice requires property, since it is a violation of the right to property [Locke] |
19879 | A man owns land if he cultivates it, to the limits of what he needs [Locke] |
19898 | Soldiers can be commanded to die, but not to hand over their money [Locke] |
19881 | The aim of law is not restraint, but to make freedom possible [Locke] |
19868 | It is only by a law of Nature that we can justify punishing foreigners [Locke] |
19867 | Reparation and restraint are the only justifications for punishment [Locke] |
19912 | Self-defence is natural, but not the punishment of superiors by inferiors [Locke] |
19869 | Punishment should make crime a bad bargain, leading to repentance and deterrence [Locke] |
19899 | The consent of the people is essential for any tax [Locke] |
15997 | We are so far from understanding the workings of natural bodies that it is pointless to even try [Locke] |
15978 | I take 'matter' to be a body, excluding its extension in space and its shape [Locke] |
15170 | We distinguish species by their nominal essence, not by their real essence [Locke] |
15993 | If we observe total regularity, there must be some unknown law and relationships controlling it [Locke] |
12497 | Causes are the substances which have the powers to produce action [Locke] |
12550 | If we knew the minute mechanics of hemlock, we could predict that it kills men [Locke] |
15966 | Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
15984 | The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke] |
15950 | We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke] |
7713 | We identify substances by supposing that groups of sensations arise from an essence [Locke] |
12545 | Other spirits may exceed us in knowledge, by knowing the inward constitution of things [Locke] |
12484 | Motion is just change of distance between two things [Locke] |
15986 | Boyle and Locke suspect forces of being occult [Locke, by Alexander,P] |
16685 | An insurmountable force in a body keeps our hands apart when we handle it [Locke] |
15980 | We can locate the parts of the universe, but not the whole thing [Locke] |
12486 | An 'instant' is where we perceive no succession, and is the time of a single idea [Locke] |
12487 | We can never show that two successive periods of time were equal [Locke] |
12567 | It is inconceivable that unthinking matter could produce intelligence [Locke] |
12570 | The finite and dependent should obey the supreme and infinite [Locke] |
12565 | God has given us no innate idea of himself [Locke] |
12566 | We exist, so there is Being, which requires eternal being [Locke] |
12571 | If miracles aim at producing belief, it is plausible that their events are very unusual [Locke] |