176 ideas
| 21916 | Philosophers can't be religious, and don't need to be; philosophy is perilous but free [Schopenhauer] |
| 4171 | Philosophy considers only the universal, in nature as everywhere else [Schopenhauer] |
| 4186 | Everyone is conscious of all philosophical truths, but philosophers bring them to conceptual awareness [Schopenhauer] |
| 12171 | Absurdity is incongruity between correct and false points of view [Schopenhauer] |
| 21366 | Metaphysics must understand the world thoroughly, as a principal source of knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
| 21474 | Metaphysics studies the inexplicable ends of explanation [Schopenhauer] |
| 19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
| 19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
| 21918 | Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 4187 | 'There is nothing without a reason why it should be rather than not be' (a generalisation of 'Why?') [Schopenhauer] |
| 19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
| 10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
| 16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
| 19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
| 19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
| 19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
| 19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
| 16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
| 15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
| 19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
| 10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
| 13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
| 19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
| 19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
| 19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
| 19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
| 19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
| 15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
| 18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
| 19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
| 2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
| 10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
| 10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
| 17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
| 10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
| 16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
| 19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 12129 | 'Truth' may only apply within a theory [Kuhn] |
| 19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
| 10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
| 10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
| 13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
| 18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
| 10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
| 13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
| 19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
| 18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
| 18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
| 13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
| 13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
| 13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
| 13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
| 16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
| 4168 | Matter and intellect are inseparable correlatives which only exist relatively, and for each other [Schopenhauer] |
| 21470 | For me the objective thing-in-itself is the will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21926 | Schopenhauer, unlike other idealists, says reality is irrational [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 4167 | The knowing subject and the crude matter of the world are both in themselves unknowable [Schopenhauer] |
| 21920 | No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
| 21362 | Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 4192 | All necessity arises from causation, which is conditioned; there is no absolute or unconditioned necessity [Schopenhauer] |
| 4190 | All understanding is an immediate apprehension of the causal relation [Schopenhauer] |
| 21479 | Knowledge is not power! Ignorant people possess supreme authority [Schopenhauer] |
| 4165 | Descartes found the true beginning of philosophy with the Cogito, in the consciousness of the individual [Schopenhauer] |
| 21361 | For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 21923 | Schopenhauer can't use force/energy instead of 'will', because he is not a materialist [Lewis,PB on Schopenhauer] |
| 4162 | The world only exists in relation to something else, as an idea of the one who conceives it [Schopenhauer] |
| 21922 | We know reality because we know our own bodies and actions [Schopenhauer] |
| 21913 | Kant rightly separates appearance and thing-in-itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 21919 | Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 21476 | A priori propositions are those we could never be seriously motivated to challenge [Schopenhauer] |
| 4164 | Direct feeling of the senses are merely data; perception of the world comes with understanding causes [Schopenhauer] |
| 4163 | All perception is intellectual [Schopenhauer] |
| 22191 | Kuhn's scientists don't aim to falsifying their paradigm, because that is what they rely on [Kuhn, by Gorham] |
| 18076 | Most theories are continually falsified [Kuhn, by Kitcher] |
| 6809 | Kuhn came to accept that all scientists agree on a particular set of values [Kuhn, by Bird] |
| 22183 | Switching scientific paradigms is a conversion experience [Kuhn] |
| 6162 | Kuhn has a description theory of reference, so the reference of 'electron' changes with the descriptions [Rowlands on Kuhn] |
| 22184 | Incommensurability assumes concepts get their meaning from within the theory [Kuhn, by Okasha] |
| 7619 | Galileo's notions can't be 'incommensurable' if we can fully describe them [Putnam on Kuhn] |
| 12128 | In theory change, words shift their natural reference, so the theories are incommensurable [Kuhn] |
| 21473 | All knowledge and explanation rests on the inexplicable [Schopenhauer] |
| 21917 | The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 4166 | A consciousness without an object is no consciousness [Schopenhauer] |
| 21369 | We have hidden and unadmitted desires and fears, suppressed because of vanity [Schopenhauer] |
| 21478 | Half our thinking is unconscious, and we reach conclusions while unaware of premises [Schopenhauer] |
| 4191 | What we know in ourselves is not a knower but a will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21367 | I know both aspects of my body, as representation, and as will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21368 | The knot of the world is the use of 'I' to refer to both willing and knowing [Schopenhauer] |
| 4175 | It is as perverse to resent our individuality being replaced by others, as to resent the body renewing itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 4176 | We all regard ourselves a priori as free, but see from experience that character and motive compel us [Schopenhauer] |
| 4170 | Man's actions are not free, because they follow strictly from impact of motive on character [Schopenhauer] |
| 21477 | We don't control our own thinking [Schopenhauer] |
| 21921 | Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21475 | All of our concepts are borrowed from perceptual knowledge [Schopenhauer] |
| 13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
| 4169 | Every true act of will is also at once and without exception a movement of the body [Schopenhauer] |
| 7187 | Schopenhauer was caught in Christian ideals, because he didn't deify his 'will' [Nietzsche on Schopenhauer] |
| 21365 | Only the will is thing-in-itself, seen both in blind nature and in human action [Schopenhauer] |
| 21924 | As the subject of willing I am wretched, but absorption in knowledge is bliss [Schopenhauer] |
| 4173 | If we were essentially intellect rather than will, our moral worth would depend on imagined motives [Schopenhauer] |
| 21363 | Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer] |
| 21372 | Aesthetics concerns how we can take pleasure in an object, with no reference to the will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21370 | Schopenhauer is a chief proponent of aesthetic experience as 'disinterested' [Schopenhauer, by Janaway] |
| 20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
| 21488 | The beautiful is a perception of Plato's Forms, which eliminates the will [Schopenhauer] |
| 4182 | A principal pleasure of the beautiful is that it momentarily silences the will [Schopenhauer] |
| 21928 | The Sublime fights for will-less knowing, when faced with a beautiful threat to humanity [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 21927 | Schopenhauer emphasises Ideas in art, unlike most romantics [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB] |
| 8116 | The will-less contemplation of art brings a liberation from selfhood [Schopenhauer, by Gardner] |
| 4174 | Man is more beautiful than anything else, and the loftiest purpose of art is to reveal his nature [Schopenhauer] |
| 21380 | The only aim of our existence is to grasp that non-existence would be better [Schopenhauer] |
| 21374 | We should no more expect ethical theory to produce good people than aesthetics to produce artists [Schopenhauer] |
| 21378 | We clearly feel responsible for our deeds, because we are quite certain that we did them [Schopenhauer] |
| 21375 | Reason can be vicious, and great crimes have to be rational [Schopenhauer] |
| 21915 | To deduce morality from reason is blasphemy, because it is holy, and far above reason [Schopenhauer] |
| 21483 | Man is essentially a dreadful wild animal [Schopenhauer] |
| 21379 | Man's three basic ethical incentives are egoism, malice and compassion [Schopenhauer] |
| 4181 | Every good is essentially relative, for it has its essential nature only in its relation to a desiring will [Schopenhauer] |
| 5649 | Will casts aside each of its temporary fulfilments, so human life has no ultimate aim [Schopenhauer, by Scruton] |
| 4177 | Most people would probably choose non-existence at the end of their life, rather than relive the whole thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 4185 | Altruistic people make less distinction than usual between themselves and others [Schopenhauer] |
| 4183 | Only self-love can motivate morality, but that also makes it worthless [Schopenhauer] |
| 4172 | Happiness is the swift movement from desire to satisfaction, and then again on to desire [Schopenhauer] |
| 21371 | We can never attain happiness while our will is pursuing desires [Schopenhauer] |
| 21466 | Pleasure is weaker, and pain stronger, than we expect [Schopenhauer] |
| 4184 | Virtue must spring from an intuitive recognition that other people are essentially like us [Schopenhauer] |
| 21484 | A man's character can be learned from a single characteristic action [Schopenhauer] |
| 21481 | Buddhists wisely start with the cardinal vices [Schopenhauer] |
| 21482 | The five Chinese virtues: pity, justice, politeness, wisdom, honesty [Schopenhauer] |
| 21469 | Human life is a mistake, shown by boredom, which is direct awareness of the fact [Schopenhauer] |
| 21480 | Boredom is only felt by those clever enough to need activity [Schopenhauer] |
| 21485 | The state only exists to defend citizens, from exterior threats, and from one another [Schopenhauer] |
| 21486 | Poverty and slavery are virtually two words for the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 21487 | The freedom of the press to sell poison outweighs its usefulness [Schopenhauer] |
| 21471 | If suicide was quick and easy, most people would have done it by now [Schopenhauer] |
| 21467 | Would humanity still exist if sex wasn't both desired and pleasurable? [Schopenhauer] |
| 21376 | Philosophy treats animals as exploitable things, ignoring the significance of their lives [Schopenhauer] |
| 4179 | The essence of nature is the will to life itself [Schopenhauer] |
| 4189 | Time may be defined as the possibility of mutually exclusive conditions of the same thing [Schopenhauer] |
| 4178 | Christianity is a pessimistic religion, in which the world is equated with evil [Schopenhauer] |
| 4180 | Religion is the mythical clothing of the truth which is inaccessible to the crude human intellect [Schopenhauer] |
| 21472 | Only religion introduces serious issues to uneducated people [Schopenhauer] |
| 21468 | The Creator created the possibilities for worlds, so should have made a better one than this possible [Schopenhauer] |