148 ideas
| 19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
| 19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
| 19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
| 10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
| 16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
| 19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
| 19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
| 19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
| 19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
| 10365 | We might use 'facta' to refer to the truth-makers for facts [Mellor, by Schaffer,J] |
| 16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
| 15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
| 19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
| 10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
| 13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
| 19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
| 19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
| 19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
| 19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
| 19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
| 15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
| 18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
| 19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
| 19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
| 19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
| 19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
| 16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
| 2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
| 10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
| 10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
| 16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
| 17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
| 10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
| 16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
| 19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
| 19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
| 19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
| 19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
| 19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
| 10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
| 10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
| 13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
| 18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
| 10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
| 10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
| 13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
| 19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
| 18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
| 18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
| 19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
| 13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
| 13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
| 13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
| 13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
| 13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
| 16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
| 13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
| 8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
| 19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
| 10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
| 10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 18658 | The 'Kantian' self steps back from commitment to its social situation [Kymlicka] |
| 13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
| 20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
| 18650 | Teleological theories give the good priority over concern for people [Kymlicka] |
| 18664 | Maybe the particularist moral thought of women is better than the impartial public thinking of men [Kymlicka] |
| 18624 | Utilitarianism is not a decision-procedure; choice of the best procedure is an open question [Kymlicka] |
| 18626 | One view says start with equality, and infer equal weight to interests, and hence maximum utility [Kymlicka] |
| 18627 | A second view says start with maximising the good, implying aggregation, and hence equality [Kymlicka] |
| 18625 | To maximise utility should we double the population, even if life somewhat deteriorates? [Kymlicka] |
| 18638 | The difference principles says we must subsidise the costs of other people's choices [Kymlicka] |
| 23418 | Liberal state legitimacy is based on a belief in justice, not in some conception of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| 18635 | Social contract theories are usually rejected because there never was such a contract [Kymlicka] |
| 23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
| 23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
| 23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
| 23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
| 23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
| 23414 | Liberals say state intervention in culture restricts people's autonomy [Kymlicka] |
| 18630 | Utilitarianism is no longer a distinctive political position [Kymlicka] |
| 18623 | The quest of the general good is partly undermined by people's past entitlements [Kymlicka] |
| 18628 | We shouldn't endorse preferences which reject equality, and show prejudice and selfishness [Kymlicka] |
| 18629 | Using utilitarian principles to make decisions encourages cold detachment from people [Kymlicka] |
| 18637 | Utilitarianism is irrational if it tells you to trade in your rights and resources just for benefits [Kymlicka] |
| 23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
| 23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
| 18663 | Modern liberalism has added personal privacy to our personal social lives [Kymlicka] |
| 23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
| 18632 | Liberalism tends to give priority to basic liberties [Kymlicka] |
| 22818 | Liberals are not too individualistic, because people recognise and value social relations [Kymlicka] |
| 23410 | Modern liberals see a community as simply a society which respects freedom and equality [Kymlicka] |
| 23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
| 23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
| 23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
| 23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
| 23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
| 23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
| 23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
| 23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
| 23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
| 23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
| 18656 | Marxists say liberalism is unjust, because it allows exploitation in the sale of labour [Kymlicka] |
| 23409 | Community can focus on class or citizenship or ethnicity or culture [Kymlicka] |
| 18659 | The 'Kantian' view of the self misses the way it is embedded or situated in society [Kymlicka] |
| 18660 | Communitarians say we should pay more attention to our history [Kymlicka] |
| 18657 | Communitarian states only encourage fairly orthodox ideas of the good life [Kymlicka] |
| 23413 | Feminism has shown that social roles are far from fixed (as communitarians tend to see them) [Kymlicka] |
| 23419 | Communitarianism struggles with excluded marginalised groups [Kymlicka] |
| 23415 | Participation aids the quest for the good life, but why should that be a state activity? [Kymlicka] |
| 18649 | If everyone owned himself, that would prevent slavery [Kymlicka] |
| 18640 | Libertarians like the free market, but they also think that the free market is just [Kymlicka] |
| 18651 | The most valuable liberties to us need not be the ones with the most freedom [Kymlicka] |
| 18661 | Ancient freedom was free participation in politics, not private independence of life [Kymlicka] |
| 18633 | Equal opportunities seems fair, because your fate is from your choices, not your circumstances [Kymlicka] |
| 18634 | Equal opportunity arbitrarily worries about social circumstances, but ignores talents [Kymlicka] |
| 18654 | Marxists say justice is unneeded in the truly good community [Kymlicka] |
| 18652 | The Lockean view of freedom depends on whether you had a right to what is restricted [Kymlicka] |
| 23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
| 23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
| 18655 | Justice corrects social faults, but also expresses respect to individuals as ends [Kymlicka] |
| 23411 | Communitarians see justice as primarily a community matter, rather than a principle [Kymlicka] |
| 23412 | Justice resolves conflicts, but may also provoke them [Kymlicka] |
| 23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
| 4785 | Causal statements relate facts (which are whatever true propositions express) [Mellor, by Psillos] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
| 8408 | Probabilistic causation says C is a cause of E if it increases the chances of E occurring [Mellor, by Tooley] |