116 ideas
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
23966 | The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
17807 | To study formal systems, look at the whole thing, and not just how it is constructed in steps [Curry] |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
17806 | It is untenable that mathematics is general physical truths, because it needs infinity [Curry] |
17808 | Saying mathematics is logic is merely replacing one undefined term by another [Curry] |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
24005 | We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie] |
24006 | Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie] |
23978 | 'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie] |
23973 | Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie] |
23974 | Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie] |
23972 | A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie] |
23992 | Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie] |
23979 | Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie] |
23976 | If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie] |
23977 | When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie] |
23980 | It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie] |
23982 | If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie] |
24001 | Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie] |
23968 | If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie] |
23969 | We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie] |
23984 | An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie] |
23970 | Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie] |
23985 | A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie] |
23986 | Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie] |
23991 | Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie] |
23967 | Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie] |
23971 | Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie] |
23975 | Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie] |
23983 | We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie] |
23999 | Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie] |
23994 | Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie] |
23998 | Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie] |
13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
23995 | Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie] |
24000 | Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie] |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
24003 | Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie] |
24002 | We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie] |
24004 | Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie] |
23993 | Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie] |