227 ideas
3240 | There is more insight in fundamental perplexity about problems than in their supposed solutions [Nagel] |
3269 | If your life is to be meaningful as part of some large thing, the large thing must be meaningful [Nagel] |
3242 | Philosophy is the childhood of the intellect, and a culture can't skip it [Nagel] |
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
3241 | It seems mad, but the aim of philosophy is to climb outside of our own minds [Nagel] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
19199 | Some say metaphysics is a highly generalised empirical study of objects [Tarski] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
19193 | Disputes that fail to use precise scientific terminology are all meaningless [Tarski] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
1489 | Modern philosophy tends to be a theory-constructing extension of science, but there is also problem-solving [Nagel] |
3248 | Realism invites scepticism because it claims to be objective [Nagel] |
20989 | Views are objective if they don't rely on a person's character, social position or species [Nagel] |
22354 | Things cause perceptions, properties have other effects, hence we reach a 'view from nowhere' [Nagel, by Reiss/Sprenger] |
19179 | For a definition we need the words or concepts used, the rules, and the structure of the language [Tarski] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
16295 | Tarski proved that truth cannot be defined from within a given theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
15342 | Tarski proved that any reasonably expressive language suffers from the liar paradox [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19069 | 'True sentence' has no use consistent with logic and ordinary language, so definition seems hopeless [Tarski] |
10153 | In everyday language, truth seems indefinable, inconsistent, and illogical [Tarski] |
19178 | Definitions of truth should not introduce a new version of the concept, but capture the old one [Tarski] |
19177 | A definition of truth should be materially adequate and formally correct [Tarski] |
19186 | A rigorous definition of truth is only possible in an exactly specified language [Tarski] |
19194 | We may eventually need to split the word 'true' into several less ambiguous terms [Tarski] |
16296 | Tarski's Theorem renders any precise version of correspondence impossible [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10672 | Tarskian semantics says that a sentence is true iff it is satisfied by every sequence [Tarski, by Hossack] |
13338 | '"It is snowing" is true if and only if it is snowing' is a partial definition of the concept of truth [Tarski] |
15339 | Tarski gave up on the essence of truth, and asked how truth is used, or how it functions [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16302 | Tarski did not just aim at a definition; he also offered an adequacy criterion for any truth definition [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19135 | Tarski enumerates cases of truth, so it can't be applied to new words or languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
19138 | Tarski define truths by giving the extension of the predicate, rather than the meaning [Davidson on Tarski] |
4699 | Tarski made truth relative, by only defining truth within some given artificial language [Tarski, by O'Grady] |
19324 | Tarski has to avoid stating how truths relate to states of affairs [Kirkham on Tarski] |
19180 | It is convenient to attach 'true' to sentences, and hence the language must be specified [Tarski] |
19181 | In the classical concept of truth, 'snow is white' is true if snow is white [Tarski] |
19196 | Scheme (T) is not a definition of truth [Tarski] |
19183 | Each interpreted T-sentence is a partial definition of truth; the whole definition is their conjunction [Tarski] |
19182 | Use 'true' so that all T-sentences can be asserted, and the definition will then be 'adequate' [Tarski] |
19198 | We don't give conditions for asserting 'snow is white'; just that assertion implies 'snow is white' is true [Tarski] |
15410 | Truth only applies to closed formulas, but we need satisfaction of open formulas to define it [Burgess on Tarski] |
18811 | Tarski uses sentential functions; truly assigning the objects to variables is what satisfies them [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
15365 | We can define the truth predicate using 'true of' (satisfaction) for variables and some objects [Tarski, by Horsten] |
19314 | For physicalism, reduce truth to satisfaction, then define satisfaction as physical-plus-logic [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19316 | Insight: don't use truth, use a property which can be compositional in complex quantified sentence [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
19175 | Tarski gave axioms for satisfaction, then derived its explicit definition, which led to defining truth [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19184 | The best truth definition involves other semantic notions, like satisfaction (relating terms and objects) [Tarski] |
19191 | Specify satisfaction for simple sentences, then compounds; true sentences are satisfied by all objects [Tarski] |
19188 | We can't use a semantically closed language, or ditch our logic, so a meta-language is needed [Tarski] |
19189 | The metalanguage must contain the object language, logic, and defined semantics [Tarski] |
19134 | Tarski defined truth for particular languages, but didn't define it across languages [Davidson on Tarski] |
16304 | Tarski didn't capture the notion of an adequate truth definition, as Convention T won't prove non-contradiction [Halbach on Tarski] |
2571 | Tarski says that his semantic theory of truth is completely neutral about all metaphysics [Tarski, by Haack] |
10821 | Physicalists should explain reference nonsemantically, rather than getting rid of it [Tarski, by Field,H] |
10822 | A physicalist account must add primitive reference to Tarski's theory [Field,H on Tarski] |
10824 | If listing equivalences is a reduction of truth, witchcraft is just a list of witch-victim pairs [Field,H on Tarski] |
16303 | Tarski made truth respectable, by proving that it could be defined [Tarski, by Halbach] |
10969 | Tarski had a theory of truth, and a theory of theories of truth [Tarski, by Read] |
17746 | Tarski's 'truth' is a precise relation between the language and its semantics [Tarski, by Walicki] |
10904 | Tarskian truth neglects the atomic sentences [Mulligan/Simons/Smith on Tarski] |
15322 | Tarski's had the first axiomatic theory of truth that was minimally adequate [Tarski, by Horsten] |
16306 | Tarski defined truth, but an axiomatisation can be extracted from his inductive clauses [Tarski, by Halbach] |
19141 | Tarski thought axiomatic truth was too contingent, and in danger of inconsistencies [Tarski, by Davidson] |
19190 | We need an undefined term 'true' in the meta-language, specified by axioms [Tarski] |
19197 | Truth can't be eliminated from universal claims, or from particular unspecified claims [Tarski] |
19185 | Semantics is a very modest discipline which solves no real problems [Tarski] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
19195 | Truth tables give prior conditions for logic, but are outside the system, and not definitions [Tarski] |
10152 | Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski] |
10048 | There is no clear boundary between the logical and the non-logical [Tarski] |
13337 | A language: primitive terms, then definition rules, then sentences, then axioms, and finally inference rules [Tarski] |
18812 | Split out the logical vocabulary, make an assignment to the rest. It's logical if premises and conclusion match [Tarski, by Rumfitt] |
10694 | Logical consequence is when in any model in which the premises are true, the conclusion is true [Tarski, by Beall/Restall] |
10479 | Logical consequence: true premises give true conclusions under all interpretations [Tarski, by Hodges,W] |
13344 | X follows from sentences K iff every model of K also models X [Tarski] |
19192 | The truth definition proves semantic contradiction and excluded middle laws (not the logic laws) [Tarski] |
18759 | Identity is invariant under arbitrary permutations, so it seems to be a logical term [Tarski, by McGee] |
10823 | A name denotes an object if the object satisfies a particular sentential function [Tarski] |
18756 | Tarski built a compositional semantics for predicate logic, from dependent satisfactions [Tarski, by McGee] |
19313 | Tarksi invented the first semantics for predicate logic, using this conception of truth [Tarski, by Kirkham] |
13335 | Semantics is the concepts of connections of language to reality, such as denotation, definition and truth [Tarski] |
13336 | A language containing its own semantics is inconsistent - but we can use a second language [Tarski] |
13339 | A sentence is satisfied when we can assert the sentence when the variables are assigned [Tarski] |
13340 | Satisfaction is the easiest semantical concept to define, and the others will reduce to it [Tarski] |
16323 | The object language/ metalanguage distinction is the basis of model theory [Tarski, by Halbach] |
13343 | A 'model' is a sequence of objects which satisfies a complete set of sentential functions [Tarski] |
13341 | Using the definition of truth, we can prove theories consistent within sound logics [Tarski] |
8940 | Tarski avoids the Liar Paradox, because truth cannot be asserted within the object language [Tarski, by Fisher] |
19187 | The Liar makes us assert a false sentence, so it must be taken seriously [Tarski] |
10157 | Tarski improved Hilbert's geometry axioms, and without set-theory [Tarski, by Feferman/Feferman] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
10154 | Tarski's theory of truth shifted the approach away from syntax, to set theory and semantics [Feferman/Feferman on Tarski] |
4242 | Pure supervenience explains nothing, and is a sign of something fundamental we don't know [Nagel] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
3291 | Emergent properties appear at high levels of complexity, but aren't explainable by the lower levels [Nagel] |
10151 | I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
3249 | Modern science depends on the distinction between primary and secondary qualities [Nagel] |
22429 | We achieve objectivity by dropping secondary qualities, to focus on structural primary qualities [Nagel] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
3296 | Sense-data are a false objectification of what is essentially subjective [Nagel] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
3247 | Epistemology is centrally about what we should believe, not the definition of knowledge [Nagel] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
3271 | We can't control our own beliefs [Nagel] |
3270 | Justifications come to an end when we want them to [Nagel] |
3252 | Scepticism is based on ideas which scepticism makes impossible [Nagel] |
1490 | You would have to be very morally lazy to ignore criticisms of your own culture [Nagel] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
3251 | Observed regularities are only predictable if we assume hidden necessity [Nagel] |
3295 | Inner v outer brings astonishment that we are a particular person [Nagel] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
2957 | Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
3285 | We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel] |
3293 | If you assert that we have an ego, you can still ask if that future ego will be me [Nagel] |
3244 | Personal identity cannot be fully known a priori [Nagel] |
3245 | The question of whether a future experience will be mine presupposes personal identity [Nagel] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
3246 | I can't even conceive of my brain being split in two [Nagel] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
3292 | The most difficult problem of free will is saying what the problem is [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
4001 | The meaning of a word contains all its possible uses as well as its actual ones [Nagel] |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
13345 | Sentences are 'analytical' if every sequence of objects models them [Tarski] |
6479 | Noninterference requires justification as much as interference does [Nagel] |
20407 | Taste is the capacity to judge an object or representation which is thought to be beautiful [Tarski, by Schellekens] |
6450 | Morality must be motivating, and not because of pre-moral motives [Nagel] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
3284 | There is no one theory of how to act (or what to believe) [Nagel] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
3257 | Total objectivity can't see value, but it sees many people with values [Nagel] |
3265 | We don't worry about the time before we were born the way we worry about death [Nagel] |
3263 | If our own life lacks meaning, devotion to others won't give it meaning [Nagel] |
3256 | Pain doesn't have a further property of badness; it gives a reason for its avoidance [Nagel] |
3272 | Moral luck can arise in character, preconditions, actual circumstances, and outcome [Nagel] |
6447 | Game theory misses out the motivation arising from the impersonal standpoint [Nagel] |
3261 | Something may be 'rational' either because it is required or because it is acceptable [Nagel] |
3258 | If cockroaches can't think about their actions, they have no duties [Nagel] |
6446 | In ethics we abstract from our identity, but not from our humanity [Nagel] |
3282 | The general form of moral reasoning is putting yourself in other people's shoes [Nagel] |
3294 | As far as possible we should become instruments to realise what is best from an eternal point of view [Nagel] |
3254 | If we can decide how to live after stepping outside of ourselves, we have the basis of a moral theory [Nagel] |
3264 | We should see others' viewpoints, but not lose touch with our own values [Nagel] |
6477 | I can only universalise a maxim if everyone else could also universalise it [Nagel] |
3255 | We find new motives by discovering reasons for action different from our preexisting motives [Nagel] |
3262 | Utilitarianism is too demanding [Nagel] |
3268 | If a small brief life is absurd, then so is a long and large one [Nagel] |
3278 | An egalitarian system must give priority to those with the worst prospects in life [Nagel] |
6448 | A legitimate system is one accepted as both impartial and reasonably partial [Nagel] |
3275 | Equality was once opposed to aristocracy, but now it opposes public utility and individual rights [Nagel] |
3281 | The ideal of acceptability to each individual underlies the appeal to equality [Nagel] |
3277 | In judging disputes, should we use one standard, or those of each individual? [Nagel] |
3274 | Equality can either be defended as good for society, or as good for individual rights [Nagel] |
3273 | Equality nowadays is seen as political, social, legal and economic [Nagel] |
6478 | Democracy is opposed to equality, if the poor are not a majority [Nagel] |
3276 | A morality of rights is very minimal, leaving a lot of human life without restrictions or duties [Nagel] |
3290 | Given the nature of heat and of water, it is literally impossible for water not to boil at the right heat [Nagel] |
15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |