45 ideas
18877 | Moral realism doesn't seem to entail the existence of any things [Cameron] |
18868 | Surely if some propositions are grounded in existence, they all are? [Cameron] |
18928 | If maximalism is necessary, then that nothing exists has a truthmaker, which it can't have [Cameron] |
18867 | Orthodox Truthmaker applies to all propositions, and necessitates their truth [Cameron] |
18873 | God fixes all the truths of the world by fixing what exists [Cameron] |
15395 | Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron] |
18931 | Determinate truths don't need extra truthmakers, just truthmakers that are themselves determinate [Cameron] |
18879 | What the proposition says may not be its truthmaker [Cameron] |
18880 | Rather than what exists, some claim that the truthmakers are ways of existence, dispositions, modalities etc [Cameron] |
18874 | Truthmaking doesn't require realism, because we can be anti-realist about truthmakers [Cameron] |
18932 | The facts about the existence of truthmakers can't have a further explanation [Cameron] |
15394 | Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron] |
18869 | Without truthmakers, negative truths must be ungrounded [Cameron] |
18923 | The present property 'having been F' says nothing about a thing's intrinsic nature [Cameron] |
18926 | One temporal distibution property grounds our present and past truths [Cameron] |
18929 | We don't want present truthmakers for the past, if they are about to cease to exist! [Cameron] |
18871 | I support the correspondence theory because I believe in truthmakers [Cameron] |
18870 | Maybe truthmaking and correspondence stand together, and are interdefinable [Cameron] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
11989 | For Russell, expressions dependent on contingent circumstances must be eliminated [Kaplan] |
18881 | For realists it is analytic that truths are grounded in the world [Cameron] |
18875 | Realism says a discourse is true or false, and some of it is true [Cameron] |
18878 | Realism says truths rest on mind-independent reality; truthmaking theories are about which features [Cameron] |
18924 | Being polka-dotted is a 'spatial distribution' property [Cameron] |
15401 | Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron] |
15393 | An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
15396 | Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron] |
18930 | Change is instantiation of a non-uniform distributional property, like 'being red-then-orange' [Cameron] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
18872 | We should reject distinct but indiscernible worlds [Cameron] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
11990 | 'Haecceitism' says that sameness or difference of individuals is independent of appearances [Kaplan] |
9668 | 'Haecceitism' is common thisness under dissimilarity, or distinct thisnesses under resemblance [Kaplan] |
11991 | If quantification into modal contexts is legitimate, that seems to imply some form of haecceitism [Kaplan] |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
14080 | Are causal descriptions part of the causal theory of reference, or are they just metasemantic? [Kaplan, by Schaffer,J] |
14894 | Indexicals have a 'character' (the standing meaning), and a 'content' (truth-conditions for one context) [Kaplan, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14700 | 'Content' gives the standard modal profile, and 'character' gives rules for a context [Kaplan, by Schroeter] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |
18927 | Surely if things extend over time, then time itself must be extended? [Cameron] |