18 ideas
18487 | We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge] |
18488 | We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge] |
9052 | Vague predicates lack application; there are no borderline cases; vague F is not F [Unger, by Keefe/Smith] |
16070 | There are no objects with proper parts; there are only mereological simples [Unger, by Wasserman] |
15083 | The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale] |
15084 | In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale] |
12180 | Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge] |
12184 | Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge] |
12181 | Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge] |
12183 | It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge] |
12192 | The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge] |
12182 | We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge] |
12187 | Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge] |
12186 | Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge] |
8724 | The meaning of 'know' does not change from courtroom to living room [Unger] |
8722 | No one knows anything, and no one is ever justified or reasonable [Unger] |
8723 | An evil scientist may give you a momentary life, with totally false memories [Unger] |
7295 | Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A] |