Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Alistair Mitchell, Richard L. Kirkham and Peter Klein

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12 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
8833 Why should we prefer coherent beliefs? [Klein,P]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369 There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
19315 In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
19317 An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
19322 Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
8834 Infinitism avoids a regress, circularity or arbitrariness, by saying warrant just increases [Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8838 If justification is endless, no link in the chain is ultimately justified [Ginet on Klein,P]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8839 Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series [Klein,P]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7295 Maybe induction is only reliable IF reality is stable [Mitchell,A]