35 ideas
6602 | Philosophy is like a statue which is worshipped but never advances [Bacon] |
12124 | Metaphysics is the best knowledge, because it is the simplest [Bacon] |
12123 | Natural history supports physical knowledge, which supports metaphysical knowledge [Bacon] |
12119 | Physics studies transitory matter; metaphysics what is abstracted and necessary [Bacon] |
12120 | Physics is of material and efficient causes, metaphysics of formal and final causes [Bacon] |
17750 | The first clear proof of the consistency of the first order predicate logic was in 1928 [Hilbert/Ackermann, by Walicki] |
16639 | Only individual bodies exist [Bacon] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
16625 | In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon] |
16033 | There are only individual bodies containing law-based powers, and the Forms are these laws [Bacon] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
16724 | The senses deceive, but also show their own errors [Bacon] |
12121 | We don't assume there is no land, because we can only see sea [Bacon] |
3648 | Empiricists are collecting ants; rationalists are spinning spiders; and bees do both [Bacon] |
12117 | Science moves up and down between inventions of causes, and experiments [Bacon] |
6603 | Nature is revealed when we put it under pressure rather than observe it [Bacon] |
21950 | Science must clear away the idols of the mind if they are ever going to find the truth [Bacon] |
12127 | Many different theories will fit the observed facts [Bacon] |
12126 | People love (unfortunately) extreme generality, rather than particular knowledge [Bacon] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
12125 | Teleological accounts are fine in metaphysics, but they stop us from searching for the causes [Bacon] |
16624 | Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon] |
12118 | Essences are part of first philosophy, but as part of nature, not part of logic [Bacon] |
7399 | Even without religion, there are many guides to morality [Bacon] |