Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Allan Gibbard, John Greco and Trent Dougherty

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 1. Nature of Wisdom
19735 Wisdom has a higher value than understanding, which has a higher value than knowledge [Greco]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14064 If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard]
14066 A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard]
14067 Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard]
14069 We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
14076 Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14077 Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
14070 A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
14073 Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14065 Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard]
14074 Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
14072 Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard]
14078 Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
14079 Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
19701 Fallibilism is consistent with dogmatism or scepticism, and is not alternative to them [Dougherty]
19700 It is best to see the fallibility in the reasons, rather than in the agents or the knowledge [Dougherty]
19702 We can't normally say that we know something 'but it might be false' [Dougherty]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
19734 If value is practical, knowledge is no better than true opinion [Greco]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
19733 Externalist theories don't explain why knowledge has value [Greco]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
14071 Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard]