40 ideas
| 4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
| 10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
| 10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| 14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
| 10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
| 14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
| 10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| 10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
| 10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
| 14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
| 10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
| 10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
| 10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
| 10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
| 10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
| 14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
| 10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| 10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| 10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
| 10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
| 10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
| 10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
| 10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
| 10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |
| 16689 | The schools said spirits lack extension, and wonder how many could dance on a needle's point [More,H] |