Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Anaxagoras, New Scientist writers and John Searle

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206 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle]
Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle]
Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / k. Infinitesimals
Things get smaller without end [Anaxagoras]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing is created or destroyed; there is only mixing and separation [Anaxagoras]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Anaxagoras's concept of supreme Mind has a simple First and a multiple One [Anaxagoras, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
Current physics says matter and antimatter should have reduced to light at the big bang [New Sci.]
CP violation shows a decay imbalance in matter and antimatter, leading to matter's dominance [New Sci.]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle]
Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle]
Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle]
Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / a. Fundamental reality
Basic is the potentially perceptible, then comes the contrary qualities, and finally the 'elements' [Anaxagoras]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle]
Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle]
Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle]
A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle]
Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Snow is not white, and doesn't even appear white, because it is made of black water [Anaxagoras, by Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is a function of expectation [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
The senses are too feeble to determine the truth [Anaxagoras]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 2. Types of Scepticism
We reveal unreliability in the senses when we cannot discriminate a slow change of colour [Anaxagoras, by Sext.Empiricus]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
A system can infer the structure of the world by making predictions about it [New Sci.]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
Nous is unlimited, self-ruling and pure; it is the finest thing, with great discernment and strength [Anaxagoras]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / c. Features of mind
Mind is self-ruling, pure, ordering and ubiquitous [Anaxagoras, by Plato]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle]
Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle]
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle]
There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / d. Purpose of consciousness
Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle]
Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle]
Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle]
Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle]
Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
Neural networks can extract the car-ness of a car, or the chair-ness of a chair [New Sci.]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 2. Persons as Responsible
Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 3. Persons as Reasoners
Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle]
A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle]
An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 1. Self and Consciousness
A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle]
Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 1. Introspection
Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle]
Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Anaxagoras says mind remains pure, and so is not affected by what it changes [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle]
Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle]
We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle]
Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 7. Chinese Room
Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers]
A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle]
If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle]
A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle]
I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle]
If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle]
Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle]
Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle]
Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle]
If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle]
Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle]
Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle]
Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford]
If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
No one has yet devised a rationality test [New Sci.]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 7. Intelligence
People can be highly intelligent, yet very stupid [New Sci.]
About a third of variation in human intelligence is environmental [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 1. Psychology
Psychologists measure personality along five dimensions [New Sci.]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle]
Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle]
If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / b. Successful function
The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
Anaxagoras said a person would choose to be born to contemplate the ordered heavens [Anaxagoras]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
For Anaxagoras the Good Mind has no opposite, and causes all movement, for a higher reason [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
Mind creates the world from a mixture of pure substances [Anaxagoras, by ]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / c. Ultimate substances
Anaxagoras said that the number of principles was infinite [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
The ultimate constituents of reality are the homoeomeries [Anaxagoras, by Vlastos]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
Anaxagoreans regard the homoeomeries as elements, which compose earth, air, fire and water [Anaxagoras, by Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
Anaxagoras says mind produces order and causes everything [Anaxagoras, by Plato]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / d. Gravity
Gravity is unusual, in that it always attracts and never repels [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / d. Entropy
Entropy is the only time-asymmetric law, so time may be linked to entropy [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
In the Big Bang general relativity fails, because gravity is too powerful [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / a. Electrodynamics
Quantum electrodynamics incorporates special relativity and quantum mechanics [New Sci.]
Light moves at a constant space-time speed, but its direction is in neither space nor time [New Sci.]
Photons have zero rest mass, so virtual photons have infinite range [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
In the standard model all the fundamental force fields merge at extremely high energies [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / c. Electrons
Electrons move fast, so are subject to special relativity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / d. Quantum mechanics
Quantum states are measured by external time, of unknown origin [New Sci.]
The Schrödinger equation describes the evolution of an object's wave function in Hilbert space [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / a. Chromodynamics
The strong force is repulsive at short distances, strong at medium, and fades at long [New Sci.]
The strong force binds quarks tight, and the nucleus more weakly [New Sci.]
Gluons, the particles carrying the strong force, interact because of their colour charge [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 3. Chromodynamics / b. Quarks
Quarks in threes can build hadrons with spin ½ or with spin 3/2 [New Sci.]
Three different colours of quark (as in the proton) can cancel out to give no colour [New Sci.]
Classifying hadrons revealed two symmetry patterns, produced by three basic elements [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / b. Standard model
Three particles enable the weak force: W+ and W- are charged, and Z° is not [New Sci.]
The four fundamental forces (gravity, electromagnetism, weak and strong) are the effects of particles [New Sci.]
The weak force explains beta decay, and the change of type by quarks and leptons [New Sci.]
The weak force particles are heavy, so the force has a short range [New Sci.]
Why do the charges of the very different proton and electron perfectly match up? [New Sci.]
The Standard Model cannot explain dark energy, survival of matter, gravity, or force strength [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / c. Particle properties
Fermions, with spin ½, are antisocial, and cannot share quantum states [New Sci.]
Spin is akin to rotation, and is easily measured in a magnetic field [New Sci.]
Spin is a built-in ration of angular momentum [New Sci.]
Particles are spread out, with wave-like properties, and higher energy shortens the wavelength [New Sci.]
Quarks have red, green or blue colour charge (akin to electric charge) [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / d. Mass
The mass of protons and neutrinos is mostly binding energy, not the quarks [New Sci.]
Gravitional mass turns out to be the same as inertial mass [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / e. Protons
Top, bottom, charm and strange quarks quickly decay into up and down [New Sci.]
Neutrons are slightly heavier than protons, and decay into them by emitting an electron [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / f. Neutrinos
Neutrinos were proposed as the missing energy in neutron beta decay [New Sci.]
Only neutrinos spin anticlockwise [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / g. Anti-matter
Standard antineutrinos have opposite spin and opposite lepton number [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / a. Electro-weak unity
The symmetry of unified electromagnetic and weak forces was broken by the Higgs field [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / b. String theory
In string theory space-time has a grainy indivisible substructure [New Sci.]
It is impossible for find a model of actuality among the innumerable models in string theory [New Sci.]
String theory needs at least 10 space-time dimensions [New Sci.]
String theory might be tested by colliding strings to make bigger 'stringballs' [New Sci.]
String theory offers a quantum theory of gravity, by describing the graviton [New Sci.]
String theory is now part of 11-dimensional M-Theory, involving p-branes [New Sci.]
Supersymmetric string theory can be expressed using loop quantum gravity [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 5. Unified Models / c. Supersymmetry
Supersymmetry has extra heavy bosons and heavy fermions [New Sci.]
Only supersymmetry offers to incorporate gravity into the scheme [New Sci.]
The evidence for supersymmetry keeps failing to appear [New Sci.]
Supersymmetry says particles and superpartners were unities, but then split [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 2. Space
Hilbert Space is an abstraction representing all possible states of a quantum system [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The Higgs field means even low energy space is not empty [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space-time may be a geometrical manifestation of quantum entanglement [New Sci.]
Einstein's merging of time with space has left us confused about the nature of time [New Sci.]
Relativity makes time and space jointly basic; quantum theory splits them, and prioritises time [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Quantum theory relies on a clock outside the system - but where is it located? [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
Entropy is puzzling, so we may need to build new laws which include time directionality [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 7. Black Holes
Black holes have entropy, but general relativity says they are unstructured, and lack entropy [New Sci.]
General relativity predicts black holes, as former massive stars, and as galaxy centres [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 8. Dark Matter
Dark matter must have mass, to produce gravity, and no electric charge, to not reflect light [New Sci.]
84.5 percent of the universe is made of dark matter [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
We are halfway to synthesising any molecule we want [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
Chemistry just needs the periodic table, and protons, electrons and neutrinos [New Sci.]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 1. Biology
Germs contain microscopic organs, which become visible as they grow [Anaxagoras]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
When things were unified, Mind set them in order [Anaxagoras]
Anaxagoras was the first to say that the universe is directed by an intelligence [Anaxagoras, by Cicero]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Past, present and future, and the movements of the heavens, were arranged by Mind [Anaxagoras]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Anaxagoras was the first recorded atheist [Anaxagoras, by Watson]
Anaxagoras was charged with impiety for calling the sun a lump of stone [Anaxagoras, by Plutarch]