44 ideas
| 3593 | The only way to specify the corresponding fact is asserting the sentence [Williams,M] |
| 3585 | Coherence needs positive links, not just absence of conflict [Williams,M] |
| 3584 | Justification needs coherence, while truth might be ideal coherence [Williams,M] |
| 3599 | Deduction shows entailments, not what to believe [Williams,M] |
| 7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
| 3591 | We could never pin down how many beliefs we have [Williams,M] |
| 3582 | Propositions make error possible, so basic experiential knowledge is impossible [Williams,M] |
| 3592 | Phenomenalism is a form of idealism [Williams,M] |
| 3579 | Sense data avoid the danger of misrepresenting the world [Williams,M] |
| 3581 | Sense data can't give us knowledge if they are non-propositional [Williams,M] |
| 3564 | Is it people who are justified, or propositions? [Williams,M] |
| 8851 | Coherentists say that regress problems are assuming 'linear' justification [Williams,M] |
| 3595 | What works always takes precedence over theories [Williams,M] |
| 8849 | Traditional foundationalism is radically internalist [Williams,M] |
| 3580 | Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations [Williams,M] |
| 8853 | Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3576 | Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M] |
| 3577 | Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M] |
| 3589 | Why should diverse parts of our knowledge be connected? [Williams,M] |
| 3590 | Coherence theory must give a foundational status to coherence itself [Williams,M] |
| 3571 | Externalism does not require knowing that you know [Williams,M] |
| 3574 | Externalism ignores the social aspect of knowledge [Williams,M] |
| 3569 | In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M] |
| 3567 | How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M] |
| 3586 | Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M] |
| 3573 | Externalist reliability refers to a range of conventional conditions [Williams,M] |
| 3565 | Sometimes I ought to distrust sources which are actually reliable [Williams,M] |
| 3566 | We control our beliefs by virtue of how we enquire [Williams,M] |
| 8852 | In the context of scepticism, externalism does not seem to be an option [Williams,M] |
| 3594 | Scepticism just reveals our limited ability to explain things [Williams,M] |
| 3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3575 | Scepticism can involve discrepancy, relativity, infinity, assumption and circularity [Williams,M] |
| 7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
| 3587 | Seeing electrons in a cloud chamber requires theory [Williams,M] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
| 7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
| 3588 | Foundationalists base meaning in words, coherentists base it in sentences [Williams,M] |
| 7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
| 7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
| 7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
| 7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
| 7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |