86 ideas
19441 | All philosophies presuppose their historical moment, and arise from it [Feuerbach] |
19456 | Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach] |
19442 | I don't study Plato for his own sake; the primary aim is always understanding [Feuerbach] |
6928 | Only that which can be an object of religion is an object of philosophy [Feuerbach] |
6918 | Philosophy should not focus on names, but on the determined nature of things [Feuerbach] |
6904 | Modern philosophy begins with Descartes' abstraction from sensation and matter [Feuerbach] |
6931 | Empiricism is right about ideas, but forgets man himself as one of our objects [Feuerbach] |
6933 | The laws of reality are also the laws of thought [Feuerbach] |
19444 | Each proposition has an antithesis, and truth exists as its refutation [Feuerbach] |
19445 | A dialectician has to be his own opponent [Feuerbach] |
19443 | Truth forges an impersonal unity between people [Feuerbach] |
14650 | Maybe proper names involve essentialism [Plantinga] |
14648 | Could I name all of the real numbers in one fell swoop? Call them all 'Charley'? [Plantinga] |
14664 | Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga] |
6919 | Absolute thought remains in another world from being [Feuerbach] |
19457 | Being is what is undetermined, and hence indistinguishable [Feuerbach] |
6920 | Being posits essence, and my essence is my being [Feuerbach] |
6921 | Particularity belongs to being, whereas generality belongs to thought [Feuerbach] |
6926 | The only true being is of the senses, perception, feeling and love [Feuerbach] |
19446 | To our consciousness it is language which looks unreal [Feuerbach] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14647 | Surely self-identity is essential to Socrates? [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
13132 | A snowball's haecceity is the property of being identical with itself [Plantinga, by Westerhoff] |
14666 | Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14646 | An object has a property essentially if it couldn't conceivably have lacked it [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14642 | Expressing modality about a statement is 'de dicto'; expressing it of property-possession is 'de re' [Plantinga] |
14643 | 'De dicto' true and 'de re' false is possible, and so is 'de dicto' false and 'de re' true [Plantinga] |
14649 | Can we find an appropriate 'de dicto' paraphrase for any 'de re' proposition? [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
11984 | Asserting a possible property is to say it would have had the property if that world had been actual [Plantinga] |
14662 | Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga] |
18383 | Plantinga says there is just this world, with possibilities expressed in propositions [Plantinga, by Armstrong] |
16472 | Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
11980 | A possible world is a maximal possible state of affairs [Plantinga] |
14651 | What Socrates could have been, and could have become, are different? [Plantinga] |
11982 | If possible Socrates differs from actual Socrates, the Indiscernibility of Identicals says they are different [Plantinga] |
11983 | It doesn't matter that we can't identify the possible Socrates; we can't identify adults from baby photos [Plantinga] |
11985 | If individuals can only exist in one world, then they can never lack any of their properties [Plantinga] |
11891 | Possibilities for an individual can only refer to that individual, in some possible world [Plantinga, by Mackie,P] |
11986 | The counterparts of Socrates have self-identity, but only the actual Socrates has identity-with-Socrates [Plantinga] |
11987 | Counterpart Theory absurdly says I would be someone else if things went differently [Plantinga] |
6908 | Consciousness is absolute reality, and everything exists through consciousness [Feuerbach] |
19447 | The Absolute is the 'and' which unites 'spirit and nature' [Feuerbach] |
6932 | Ideas arise through communication, and reason is reached through community [Feuerbach] |
6935 | In man the lowest senses of smell and taste elevate themselves to intellectual acts [Feuerbach] |
6356 | Maybe a reliable justification must come from a process working with its 'proper function' [Plantinga, by Pollock/Cruz] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19451 | When absorbed in deep reflection, is your reason in control, or is it you? [Feuerbach] |
6925 | The new philosophy thinks of the concrete in a concrete (not a abstract) manner [Feuerbach] |
9086 | The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga] |
9087 | Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga] |
16469 | Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
16470 | Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga] |
14663 | Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga] |
9085 | If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga] |
9084 | Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga] |
6924 | Plotinus was ashamed to have a body [Feuerbach] |
6927 | If you love nothing, it doesn't matter whether something exists or not [Feuerbach] |
19450 | Reason, love and will are the highest perfections and essence of man - the purpose of his life [Feuerbach] |
19458 | Egoism is the only evil, love the only good; genuine love produces all the other virtues [Feuerbach] |
6934 | Man is not a particular being, like animals, but a universal being [Feuerbach] |
6936 | The essence of man is in community, but with distinct individuals [Feuerbach] |
19448 | Consciousness is said to distinguish man from animals - consciousness of his own species [Feuerbach] |
19454 | A God needs justice, kindness and wisdom, but those concepts don't depend on the concept of God [Feuerbach] |
6913 | God's existence cannot be separated from essence and concept, which can only be thought as existing [Feuerbach] |
20704 | A possible world contains a being of maximal greatness - which is existence in all worlds [Plantinga, by Davies,B] |
19452 | The nature of God is an expression of human nature [Feuerbach] |
6903 | If God is only an object for man, then only the essence of man is revealed in God [Feuerbach] |
6923 | God is what man would like to be [Feuerbach] |
6911 | God is for us a mere empty idea, which we fill with our own ego and essence [Feuerbach] |
19453 | If love, goodness and personality are human, the God who is their source is anthropomorphic [Feuerbach] |
6902 | Catholicism concerns God in himself, Protestantism what God is for man [Feuerbach] |
19449 | Religion is the consciousness of the infinite [Feuerbach] |
6905 | Absolute idealism is the realized divine mind of Leibnizian theism [Feuerbach] |
19455 | Today's atheism will tomorrow become a religion [Feuerbach] |
1474 | Moral evil may be acceptable to God because it allows free will (even though we don't see why this is necessary) [Plantinga, by PG] |
1475 | It is logically possible that natural evil like earthquakes is caused by Satan [Plantinga, by PG] |