18 ideas
19259 | If 2-D conceivability can a priori show possibilities, this is a defence of conceptual analysis [Vaidya] |
18755 | Validity is explained as truth in all models, because that relies on the logical terms [McGee] |
18751 | Natural language includes connectives like 'because' which are not truth-functional [McGee] |
18761 | Second-order variables need to range over more than collections of first-order objects [McGee] |
18753 | An ontologically secure semantics for predicate calculus relies on sets [McGee] |
18754 | Logically valid sentences are analytic truths which are just true because of their logical words [McGee] |
18757 | Soundness theorems are uninformative, because they rely on soundness in their proofs [McGee] |
18760 | The culmination of Euclidean geometry was axioms that made all models isomorphic [McGee] |
19262 | Essential properties are necessary, but necessary properties may not be essential [Vaidya] |
19267 | Define conceivable; how reliable is it; does inconceivability help; and what type of possibility results? [Vaidya] |
19440 | How do you know you have conceived a thing deeply enough to assess its possibility? [Vaidya] |
19268 | Inconceivability (implying impossibility) may be failure to conceive, or incoherence [Vaidya] |
19265 | Can you possess objective understanding without realising it? [Vaidya] |
19260 | Gettier deductive justifications split the justification from the truthmaker [Vaidya] |
19266 | In a disjunctive case, the justification comes from one side, and the truth from the other [Vaidya] |
3061 | Anaxarchus said that he was not even sure that he knew nothing [Anaxarchus, by Diog. Laertius] |
19264 | Aboutness is always intended, and cannot be accidental [Vaidya] |
18762 | A maxim claims that if we are allowed to assert a sentence, that means it must be true [McGee] |